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Wise: Chimpanzees and the Common Law Writs

ARTICLE
THE ENTITLEMENT OF
CHIMPANZEES TO THE COMMON
LAW WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND DE HOMINE REPLEGIANDO
STEVEN

M. WISE*

I believe that even with [the chimpanzee] "Suica's" death the
matter will continue to be discussed, especially in law school
classes, as many colleagues, attorneys, students and entities
have voiced their opinions, wishing to make those prevail.
The topic will not die with this writ, it will certainly continue
l
to remain controversial.

* President, Center for the Expansion of Fundamental Rights, Inc., Coral
Springs, Florida, presently adjunct professor teaching "Animal Rights Law," Vermont
Law School and St. Thomas Law School. I thank Christopher Green, Esq. for assuming
the heavy burden of evaluating every line of several drafts of this article. His
suggestions vastly improved the fmal version. I thank Professor Laurence H. Tribe for
his penetrating critiques. I thank law student Kristin Lupoli for her diligent research
and Ann Jones, Esq., for spending months researching antebellum Southern slave
statutes. I also thank Professor Daniel Coquillette, Professor David Favre, Bonita
Meyersfield, Esq., Katrina Sharman, Esq., Professor Joseph Vining, and David
Wolfson, Esq. for their reviews of early drafts, and the Animal Welfare Trust, Brad
Goldberg, and Jana Kohl for their support over the twenty months it took to research
and write this article.
1 In Favor of Suica, 9th Criminal Court, No. 833085-3/2005 (Bahia, Brazil Sept.
26, 2005) (written after the untimely death of Suica, a chimpanzee, halted the attempt
to have him released from a zoo by writ of habeas corpus) [hereinafter In Favor of
Suica],
English
translation
available
at
http://animallaw.info/nonuslcaseslcabrsuicaeng2005.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2006).
Both the original Portuguese decision and the English translation are on file with the
author.
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INTRODUCTION

Chimpanzees, like every other nonhuman animal, are
presently regarded as legal "things.,,2 Classified as property,
they are denied all legal rights. This allows humans to enslave
them. However, the claim that chimpanzees, and perhaps
other cognitively complex nonhuman animals, should be
entitled to basic legal rights has sparked widespread scholarly
discussion by highly-respected members of the legal academy.3
Some legal "things" require common law personhood for an
important reason: things are invisible to the civil law and lack
all rights, including the capacity to sue. Those that can suffer
for their invisibility do. But social morality changes, social
policy evolves, and human experience accrues. Yesterday an
African slave was commonly considered a rightless thing, the
day before that an English villein; today that thing may be a
human fetus, tomorrow perhaps a chimpanzee.
Employing commonly accepted legal principles, I have
offered extensive arguments over years as to why at least some
chimpanzees, and members of certain other species, should be
entitled to the substantive fundamental common law rights of
bodily liberty and bodily integrity.4 These substantive common
2 Within
the designation of "chimpanzee," I include both the common
chimpanzee and the bonobo, each of whom is equally evolutionarily close to human
beings.
3 See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass
Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum, eds., 2004) (numerous essays) [hereinafter ANIMAL
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS); ALAN DERSHOWlTZ, RIGHTS FROM
WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF RIGHTS 139, 193-199 (Perseus Books
2005); Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us
About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 4
(2001); Martha C. Nussbaum, Book Review: Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical
Basis, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1506 (2001) (review of STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE:
TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS Perseus Books 2000»; Robert R. M. Verchick, A
New Species of Rights, 89 CAL. L. REV. 207 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights,
110 YALE L. J. 527 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage Defended, 43 B.C. L. REV. 623
(2002); STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS (Perseus Books 2002) [hereinafter WISE, DRAWING THE LINE); STEVEN M. WISE,
RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (Perseus Books 2000)
[hereinafter WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE); Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution - The
Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L.
REV. 793 (1998) [hereinafter Wise, Hardly a Revolution); Steven M. Wise, The Legal
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471 (1996)
[hereinafter, Wise, Legal Thinghoodl; Steven M. Wise, How Nonhuman Animals Were
Trapped in a Nonexistent Universe, 1 ANIMAL L. 15 (1995). See also Steven M. Wise,
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law rights would qualify their holders as common law
"persons," not just "things." I do not reiterate those arguments
in this article, though I briefly summarize some of the scientific
findings that underpin the substantive arguments. This article
focuses on procedure.
It may turn out that courts reject the substantive
arguments a legal thing proffers in support of its claim to
personhood. The gap between thing and person is not easily
bridged and any legal thing's initial claim will be, as observed
Professor Christopher Stone, "bound to sound odd or
frightening or laughable ... because until the rightless thing
receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for
the use of 'us' - those who are holding rights at the time."s But
whether its substantive claims prevail on their merits or not,
the legal thing requires a procedural cause of action to assert
its claim in the first instance that it ought no longer be
considered a thing, but a person, either as a matter of fact
because it meets existing definitions of personhood, or as a
matter of law because the definition of legal person itself
should be changed to encompass it.
In this Article, I claim that humans enslave chimpanzees
and thereby deprive them of their bodily liberty and that
chimpanzees should be entitled to use the common law writs of
habeas corpus and de homine replegiando and to bring their
common law claims to bodily liberty before courts. In Part I, I
demonstrate that chimpanzees are genetically highly similar to
humans and quite cognitively and socially complex. 6 In Part II,
I argue that flexibility is part of the common law's basic
structure, that legal personhood is one of the common law's
Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS , supra note 3, at 19; Steven M. Wise, A Great Shout - Breaking the
Barriers to Legal Rights for Great Apes, in GREAT APES AND HUMANS: THE ETIDCS OF
COEXISTENCE (Benjamin Beck et al. eds., 2001); Steven M. Wise, Animal Thing to
Animal Person· Thoughts on Time, Place, and Theories, 5 ANIMAL L. 61 (1999); Dr.
Jane Goodall & Steven M. Wise, Are Chimpanzees Entitled to Fundamental Legal
Rights?, Joint Presentation to Senior Lawyers Division of the American Bar
Association, Aug. 2, 1996, reprinted in 3 ANIMAL L. 61 (1997); Steven M. Wise, Legal
Rights for Nonhuman Animals: The Case for Chimpanzees and Bonobos, 2 ANIMAL L.
179 (1996). By limiting my discussion in this article to chimpanzees, I do not mean to
imply here that members of other species either should, or should not, be entitled to
the fundamental common law right of bodily liberty.
5 CHRISTOPHER STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 8 (Oceana Publications
1996).
6 See infra notes 11-35 and accompanying text.
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basic values, that the structure of the common law requires it
to permit such a cause of action to go forward on its merits, and
that the claim of chimpanzees to common law legal personhood
should always be subject to common law re-evaluation. 7 In
Part III, I show that post-Conquest English villeins used writs
that allowed them, under certain circumstances, to be declared
free. s In Part IV, I trace the history of the common law writ of
de homine replegiando in England and America and argue that
individual chimpanzees are entitled to use it to bring their
claims to bodily liberty before common law courts. 9 In Part V, I
set out the history of the common law writ .of habeas corpus in
England and America and argue that individual chimpanzees
are entitled to use that common law writ to bring their claims
to bodily liberty before common law courts. 10
1.

CHIMPANZEES

A.

CHIMPANZEES ARE ENSLAVED AND DEPRIVED OF THEIR
BODILY LIBERTY

Chimpanzees and the other great apes are being driven
into extinction. l l By 2001, the number of free chimpanzees had
fallen, by one estimate, to as low as 150,000, and by September
2005, according to another estimate, to 100,000. 12 In 2003, The
Great Ape Project attempted the first comprehensive census of
great apes enslaved in the United States. 13 Admittedly
incomplete, the census still identified more than 3,100 great
apes in captivity. Nearly two-thirds were chimpanzees, and
See infra notes 36-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes114-156 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 157-246 and accompanying text.
11 See DALE PETERSON & KARL AMMAN, EATING APES (Univ. of California Press
2003). I have argued that this ongoing decimation of chimpanzees constitutes
genocide. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 4, at 265-266.
12 Thomas M. Butynski, Africa's Great Apes, in GREAT APES AND HUMANS: THE
ETIllCS OF COEXISTENCE (Benjamin B. Beck et al. eds., 2001): Alison Jolly, The Last
Great Apes?, 309 Science 1457, 1457 (Sept. 2, 2005). See also PETERSON & AMMAN,
supra note 11, at 263 (citing Andrew J. Marshall et al., The Plight of the Apes: A Global
Survey of Great Ape Populations (2000) (briefing for U.S. Representatives George
Miller and Jim Saxton) (stating chimpanzee populations are diminishing in ninety-one
percent of protected areas in Africa).
13 THE GREAT APE PROJECT CENSUS: RECOGNITION FOR THE UNCOUNTED (The
Great Ape Project 2003).
7
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almost 1,300 were enslaved for use in biomedical research. 14
The rest were enslaved for public entertainment in roadside
zoos, zoological parks, sanctuaries of varying quality and
purpose, and for private amusement in backyard menageries.
Because both chimpanzees and humans share the
fundamental biological urge for bodily liberty that originates in
the deepest, most ancient, reptilian part of our triune brains,
both can be enslaved. I5 Justinian's Institutes and Digest
assumed that most wild animals live in a "natural state of
freedom,,16 or a "natural state of liberty.,,17 Seventeenth century
English legal historian John Selden noted that the Digest's
definition of liberty as
the natural facultas [or power] of doing what one wants, ...
can be thought of equally well among both animals and men
if there is no relevant law which in any way restrains either
a man's will or an animal's appetite [which can be taken to
be the same kind of a thing as a will] .18

Blackstone thought the personal liberty that the writ of
habeas corpus was meant to protect was "the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving . . . to whatsoever

14 As of April 1, 2005, that number had dropped to 1,171. John L. VandeBerg et
al., A unique biomedical resource at risk, 437 NATURE 30, 31 Table 1 (Sept. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter VandeBerg et al.l.
15 PAUL
D. MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION: ROLE IN
PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS (Springer 1990). Human slavery is no longer legal
anywhere in the world. See Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253;
Nuremburg Charter, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 4, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. Al811 (Dec. 10, 1948); Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 360 U.N.T.S. 117; The European Convention on
Human Rights, art. 4(1),15(2), Nov. 4, 1950,87 U.N.T.S. 103; American Convention on
Human Rights, art. 6(1), Nov. 22, 1969, OAS T. S. No. 36; African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27,1981,1520 U.N.T.S. 26.
16 DIG. 41.1.3 (Gaius, Common Matters or Golden Things, Book 2) (''natural state
of freedom"); DIG. 41.1.55 (Proculus, Letters, Book 2) ("natural state of freedom").
Proculus was a first century jurist. DIG. 41.1.44 (Ulpian, Edict, Book 19) ("natural
freedom").
17 DIG. 41.1.5 (Gaius, Common Matters or Golden Things, Book 2) ("natural state
of liberty"); DIG. 41.2.3.14 (Paul, Edict, Book 54). Paul was a third century jurist and
contemporary of Ulpian. The Institutes refer to the "natural liberty" of animals. J.
INST. 2.1.12.
18 RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
90 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1979) (quoting JOHN SELDEN, 1 OPERA OMNIA, col. 105 (D.
Wilkins ed., 1726)).
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place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment
or restraint, unless by due course of law.,,19 Rollin C. Hurd
opened his classic 1858 treatise on personal liberty and habeas
corpus by declaring personal liberty to be
the power of unrestrained locomotion. The right to it springs
from the fundamental laws of our being. The ever-recurring
wants of the body, requiring continual labor for their
provision, and the necessity of exercise to the healthy action
of all its vital processes, render locomotion indispensable to
animal existence. Man shares these wants with inferior
animals. . .. The right of personal liberty, thus inhering in
man as an independent sentient being .... 20

One deprived of bodily liberty and forced to serve another
is a slave. For antebellum black slavery apologist Thomas R.
R. Cobb,
The slave, while possessing the power of locomotion, moves
not as his own inclination may direct, but at the bidding of
his master, who may, of his own will, imprison or restrain
him .... So utterly opposite is the position of the slave from
that of the freeman in respect to this right, that we could not
better define his condition, than to say it is the reverse of the
21
freeman.

Professor Laurence Tribe pronounced Jerom, a teenage
chimpanzee who died a decade after scientists at the Yerkes
Regional Primate Research Center injected him with HIV
viruses, to be "clearly ... enslaved.,,22 Members of the United
States National Chimpanzee Resource Committee, following its
name, refer to chimpanzees as a "national resource," a "global
resource," a "chimpanzee research resource," "chimpanzee
resources," and even as a "renewable and robust national
resource," clear affirmations that they see chimpanzees as
slaves. 23 The punishment customarily imposed upon humans
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES * 134.
ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 4 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1858).
21 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTo THE LAw OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 105 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1999).
22 Tribe, supra note 3, at 4. See also WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 4, at
1-2.
23 VandeBerg et aI., supra note 14, at 30, 31, 32 (including representatives of
19

20
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convicted of serious criminal offenses is the deprivation of
bodily liberty. Imprisonment for crime so closely resembles
slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution made an express exception for it, reading,
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States .... ,,24
B.

CHIMPANZEES ARE COMPLEX BEINGS WHO ARE CLOSELYRELATED TO AND RESEMBLE HUMANS

Over the last half century we have learned an immense
amount about chimpanzees. As Professor Andrew Whiten has
pointed out, ''We have progressed from a position of almost
complete ignorance about wild chimpanzees just decades ago,
to having gathered very detailed knowledge through hundreds
offield and laboratory studies."25 What we have learned is that
chimpanzees resemble humans in highly significant ways.
Indeed, the reason those 1,300 chimpanzees are enslaved for
use in biomedical research in the United States is "due in large
part to their genetic similarity to humans.,,26 Thus the
Committee on Long-Term Care of Chimpanzees, a part of the
Natural Research Council, concluded in 1997 that "[t]hese two
factors-scientific use and close genetic relative-cannot be
divorced; one cannot appeal to one and ignore the other."27
Just six million years ago, chimpanzees and humans
shared a common ancestor. The 2005 draft sequence of the
chimpanzee genome reveals that humans and chimpanzees
"share more than 98% of our DNA and almost all of our genes .
each of the major centers that maintain chimpanzees enslaved for biomedical research
in the United States).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
25 Andrew Whiten, The second inheritance system of chimpanzees and humans,
437 NATURE 52, 52 (Sept 1, 2005) (citations omitted).
26 Committee on Long-Term Care of Chimpanzees, National Research Council,
Chimpanzees in Research - Strategies for the Ethical Care, Management, and Use 13
(1997), available at http://fermat.nap.eduJbooksl0309058910lhtml (last visited Dec. 10,
2006).
27 [d. at 8.
The Committee concluded, without any explanation, that "the
relevant differences between humans and chimpanzees justify the use of chimpanzees
in research that would not be sanctioned if it were proposed to use human subjects,"
and that "although acute terminal studies with chimpanzees have been rare, they are
justified in some circumstances." [d. at 26. See also infra note 30 (citing works that
challenge these conclusory claims).
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,,28 "Overall, human and chimpanzee genes are extremely
similar
,,29
The divergence of single-nucleotide
substitutions between the human and chimpanzee genomes is
only about 1.06 percent, while genomic differences due to
insertions and deletions of genetic material, so-called "indels,"
is about 2.7 percent. 30 Even this small variation may not be as
significant as it might first appear. Presently it is nearly
impossible to determine whether a human DNA sequence
missing in chimpanzees was added during the course of human
evolution or lost to chimpanzees during their evolution. 31 All in
all, "Given the short time since the human-chimpanzee split, it
is likely that a few mutations of large effect are responsible for
part of the current physical-phenotypic-differences that
separate humans from chimpanzees and other great apes.',s2

28

Chris Gunter et aI., The Chimpanzee Genome, 437 NATURE 47, 47 (Sept. 1,

2005).
29 The Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, Initial sequence of the
chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome, 437 Nature 69, 76 (Sept.
1, 2005) [hereinafter Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium].
30 See Ze Cheng et al., A genome-wide comparison of recent chimpanzee and
human segmental duplications, 437 NATURE 88, 92 (Sept. 1, 2005); Chimpanzee
Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, supra note 29, at 69, 71, 73. DNA is a double
helix held together by weak bonds between base pairs of nucleotides, adenine (A),
guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). A and T always form a bond, as do G and
C. Occasionally, an A-C base pair will substitute for a G-C pair or vice-versa. Id. at 69.
This occurred in about 1.06 percent of the genes of chimpanzees and humans. Id. at
71. When considering this genetic difference, consider that "[a]ny two unrelated
humans have millions of genetic differences, making them look and even behave
differently." David B. Goldstein & Gianpiero L. CavalIeri, Understanding human
diversity, 437 NATURE 1241, 1241 (Oct. 27, 2005). See also Elizabeth Culotta &
Elizabeth Pennisi, Evolution in Action, 310 SCIENCE 1878, 1878 (Dec. 23, 2005) ("We
differ by only about 1% in the nucleotide bases that can be aligned between our two
species, and the average protein differs by less than two amino acids. But a
surprisingly large chunk of noncoding material is either inserted or deleted in the
chimp as compared to the human, bringing the total difference in DNA between our
two species to about 4%.").
31 Carina Dennis, Branching out, 437 NATURE 17, 17 (Sept. 1, 2005).
Genetic
recombination, which creates new combinations of alleles on which natural selection
can act, appears in "hotspots" of recombination that are rarely in the same place in
humans and chimpanzees.
Wendy Winckler et aI., Comparison of Fine-Scale
Recombination Rates in Humans and Chimpanzees, 308 SCIENCE 107, 107-111 (Apr. 1,
2005).
32 Wen-Hsiung Li & Matthew A. Saunders, The chimpanzee and us, 437 NATURE
50, 51 (Sept. 1, 2005). These would most likely occur through indels or changes in the
gene regulatory regions of DNA. Id. at 51. See Philipp Khaitovich et al., Parallel
Patterns of Evolution in the Genomes and Transcriptomes of Humans and
Chimpanzees, 309 SCIENCE 1850, 1853 (Sept. 16, 2005) (stating that both singlenucleotide substitutions and changes in gene expression or regulation are involved).
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So few differences separate chimpanzees and other
primates from human beings that one working group of twentytwo scientists and philosophers, formed to discuss ethical
issues that might arise from human to nonhuman' primate
neural stem cell grafting, wrote in 2005 that
[m] any of the most plausible and widely accepted candidates
for determining moral status involve mental capacities such
as the ability to feel pleasure and pain, language, rationality,
and richness of relationships.
To the extent that a
[nonhuman primate] attains those capacities, that creature
must be held in correspondingly high moral standing. 33

Chimpanzees possess these attributes. They demonstrate
that they have complex minds, are self-conscious and selfaware, exhibit some or all the elements of a theory of mind
(they know what other chimpanzees see or know what other
chimpanzees
know),
understand
symbols,
construct
complicated societies, transmit culture, use a human language
or sophisticated language-like communication system, and
engage in such complicated mental operations as deception,
pretending, imitation, and insightful solving of difficult
Humans (currently Homo sapiens) and
problems. 34
chimpanzees (currently Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) are
so genetically and evolutionarily close that prominent
scientists argue that humans and common chimpanzees should
be placed in the same subtribe, Hominina, and the same genus,
Homo, to form Homo sapiens, Homo troglodytes, and Homo
•
35
pamscus.

33 Mark Greene et al., Moral Issues of Human-Non·Human Primate Neural
Grafting, 309 SCIENCE 385 (July 1,2005).
34 See Marc Hauser, Our chimpanzee mind, 437 NATURE 60, 60 (Sept. 1, 2005);
Whiten, supra note 25, at 52-55; Greg Miller, Tool Study Supports Chimp Culture, 309
SCIENCE 1311 (Aug. 26, 2005); Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, All Animals Are Not
Equal, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 3, at
175; WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 4, at 179-230; WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE,
supra note 4, at 163-237. The Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Collaborative
responsible for sequencing the chimpanzee genome carefully stated that a feature
specific to humans was not language, but "complex language." Chimpanzee Sequencing
and Analysis Consortium, supra note 29, at 69 (emphasis added).
35 Derek E. Wildman & Morris Goodman, Humankind's Place in a Phylogenetic
Classification of Living Primates, in EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND PROCESSES: MODERN
HORIZONS: PAPERS IN HONOUR OF EVIATAR NEVO! 293 (Springer 2004) (then placed in
separate subgenera).
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II. WHY THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMON LAW ENTITLES
CHIMPANZEES TO BRING CLAIMS THAT CHALLENGE THEIR
LEGAL THINGHOOD

A.

FLEXIBILITY IS INHERENT IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE
COMMON LAW

Like all nonhuman animals, chimpanzees presently are
considered things, not persons. In order to maintain that the
common law permits them to bring claims challenging their
legal status, I must first demonstrate that the common law is
flexible enough to embrace these sorts of claims. I maintain
here that such flexibility is inherent in the very structure of the
common law.
What does the "structure" of the common law mean?
"Structure," in constitutional interpretation, refers to the way
in which a constitution is organized, what it presupposes and
implies, what its text implies without stating, what the logic is
of its scheme and substance, and what actions assist in making
its entire theme coherent and operationa1. 36
Professor
Laurence Tribe points to one of United States Supreme Court
Justice William Rehnquist's dissents as a classic exposition of
constitutional argument from structure. 37 A constitution,
36 Professor
Philip Bobbitt has identified six modes of constitutional
interpretation: (1) "textual" interpretation looks to the meaning of the words of a
constitutional provision and interprets them as they would be interpreted by the
average contemporary citizen, (2) "historical" interpretation looks to the intentions of
the framers and ratifiers of the constitutional provision being examined, (3)
"structural" interpretation infers unwritten rules from the relationships that the
Constitution as a whole mandates among the structures it sets up, (4) "doctrinal"
interpretation applies rules generated by precedents of the courts, (5) "ethical"
interpretation derives rules from the moral principles reflected in the Constitution),
and (6) "prudential" interpretation looks to balance the costs and benefits of adopting a
particular rule. PHILIP BOBBITI', CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 - 22 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1991); PHILIP BOBBITI', CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7-177 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982). Professor Laurence Tribe has
identified six similar modes of constitutional interpretation: textual, historical,
structural, precedential, moral, and an eclectic mixture of these five modes. 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 30-89 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
TRIBEJ. For other structural arguments see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (supporting judicial review); CHARLES L. BLACK,
JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSIDP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1969). The
textual and historical modes of constitutional interpretation hold little relevance for
the unwritten common law; doctrinal, ethical, moral, and prudential hold greater
promise.
37 TRIBE, supra note 36, at 41-42 (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 423, 433,
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Rehnquist wrote, is "built on certain postulates and
assumptions . . . [drawing] on shared experience and common
understanding."38 The Justice explained that the Supreme
Court often relied
on notions of a constitutional plan-the implicit ordering of
relationships within the federal system necessary to make
the Constitution a workable governing charter . . .. The
tacit postulates yielded by that ordering are as much
engrained in the fabric of the document as its express
provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied
force and often meaning . . . [whose] derogation would
39
undermine the logic of the constitutional scheme.

The common law is not a written text the way the United
States Constitution is. 40 The most respected American common
law judge of the nineteenth century was Lemuel Shaw. The
common law, Shaw wrote, "consists· of a "few broad and
comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice,
and enlightened public policy, modified and adapted to the
circumstances of all the particular cases which fall within it.,,41
Like the United States Constitution, the common law has a
structure that arises from what it presupposes, what its
workings imply, what the logic of its scheme and substance is,
and what actions assist in making its entire system coherent
and operationaL
The common law, however, is not deductive. Judge Richard
Posner has written that "[a] set of cases can compose a pattern.
But when lawyers or judges differ on what pattern it composes,
their disagreement cannot be resolved either by an appeal to
an intuitive sense of pattern or by the methods of scientific
induction.,,42 By personality or philosophy, judges tend to
emphasize one legal vision over others, either generally, or in
439 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting».
38 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 433.
39 TRIBE, supra note 36, at 41-42 (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 439
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting».
40 The British constitution is unwritten.
41 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and Me R.R., 67 Mass. 263, 267 (1854).
Shaw
served as Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1830-1860,
during the 19th century heyday of the common law.
42 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 91 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1990).
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specific legal areas. These visions are often incommensurable
and one vision usually cannot be proven objectively superior. 43
Judges holding "formal visions" marinate their decisions in
the past. Formal Judges believe they should decide the way
other judges have decided because other judges have decided
that way. They believe there must be no ''jurisprudence of
doubt.''''4
The most formal of these judges-I call them
"Precedent (Rules) Judges"-strongly prefer legal certainty to
legal correctness. They understand law to be a system of
narrow yet consistent rules that they can apply more or less
mechanically, and they value, or think that a legal system
should value, stability, certainty, and predictability.
For example, in 1955, Precedent (Rules) Judges of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered whether
that court should continue to adhere to its long-standing rule
that a plaintiff whose car was not properly registered could not
sue for injuries caused by a negligent driver. The judges
conceded that
[t]he doctrine has been called 'unique.' ... It has been very
generally criticized. As an original proposition, it could
hardly find favor with us today. The rule, however, has
stood for more than forty-six years without repeal by the
legislature. Some of us would prefer to overrule the ... case,
but the majority of the court think that its termination
45
should be at legislative, rather than at judicial, hands.

England's Lord Halsbury, in the nineteenth century, and
Lord Farwell, in the twentieth, went as far as "Precedent
(Rules) Judges" can go. Halsbury denounced "the
inconvenience-the disastrous inconvenience-of having each
question subject to being reargued and the dealings of mankind
rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions."46 Farwell
43 TRIBE, supra note 36, at 31 ("By its very nature, the ongoing debate about
competing modes of interpretation and their proper relationship is not one in which
provably 'correct' answers are likely ever to emerge and vanquish all competing
approaches."). This may not be true for all areas of the law. For example, in the area
of wills, certainty is arguably the supreme value. I argue that, in determining legal
personhood, principle should dominate precedent and policy. WISE, RATTLING THE
CAGE, supra note 4, at 114-118. See also id. at 93-100 (discussing generally the
competing visions of judging).
44 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality opinion).
45 Comeau v. Harrington, 130 N.E. 2d 554, 555 (Mass. 1955) (citations omitted).
46 London Tramways Co. v. London County Council, A.C. 375 (1898) (Halsbury,
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later announced that it was "impossible for [the Law Lords] to
create any new doctrine of common law," a rule that stood until
1966.47 To the extent certainty and stability were their
supreme values, Farwell and Halsbury could scarcely be
considered common law judges. They more closely resembled
Continental European Civil Law judges, for whom these are
the most important legal values. 48
A second category of Formal Judge is the "Precedent
(Principles) Judge." These judges also look to the past. But
they honor precedents as having established broad legal
principles, not narrow rules. They do not believe judges should
confine themselves to the specific ways in which their
predecessors formulated inflexible rules from those principles.
When justice demands change, these judges wield established
principles to reconstruct the law, sometimes profoundly, and in
ways that might have astounded the earlier judges.
For example, in 1916, the New York Court of Appeals
overturned the long-standing rule that the manufacturer of a
defective product was liable only to its immediate buyer, unless
the product was inherently dangerous. 49 Chief Judge Benjamin
Cardozo held that the owner of a new Buick .injured by the
collapse of a wheel could sue the Buick Motor Company, even
though Buick had purchased the defective wheel from another
manufacturer. "Precedents drawn from the days of travel by
stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today. The
principle ... does not change, but the things subject to the
principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a
developing civilization require them to be. ,,50 This is akin to
what Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg calls a "transformation"
L.J.).
47 Bayliss v. Bishop of London, 1 Ch. 127, 137 (1913) (Farwell, L.J.) (emphasis
added); 1 WEEKLY L.R. 1234 (1966). See W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House of
Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARv. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (1967).
48 JOHN MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION 48-49 (2d ed. 1985).
Some
federal judges in the United States are edging toward the constitutional equivalent of
common law Precedent (Rules) Judges. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore,
219 F.3d 376, 376-377 (4th Cir. 2000) ("I understand the Supreme Court to have
intended its decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to be a
decision of super-stare decisis with respect to a woman's fundamental right to choose
whether or not to proceed with a pregnancy.") (emphasis in original). This is the only
time I refer to the Civil law, as opposed to the common law. Elsewhere in this article, I
use civil, as opposed to criminal, law.
49 See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
50 [d. at 1053.
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of the common law, when judges, using "minimalist or resultcentered approaches . . . radically reconstruct the precedents
and overturn the rule the precedents announce. . . .'051 They
follow precedent, but at a high level of generality.
On the other hand, "Substantive Judges" reject the past as
a manacle. They agree with United States Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. that "[i]t is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. ,,52 They believe the common law
should be perpetually in flux and that· common law rules
should change. One of the purest Substantive Judges of the
twentieth century was England's Lord Denning. 53 On his
death, one Substantive lawyer said admiringly that Denning
had "steered the law towards the administration of justice
rather than the administration of the letter of the law," while a
Formal Lord Chancellor groused, "The trouble with Tom
Denning . . . is that he's always remaking the law, and we
never know where we are.'054
Substantive Judges' legal visions are saturated in moral,
economic, and political considerations. They believe that law
should express a community's present sense of justice, not that
of another age, and that courts should keep law abreast of
public values, prevailing understandings of justice and
morality, as well as new scientific discoveries. Substantive
Judges want to know why judges once decided a case a certain
way and whether those reasons still make sense. They do not
want issues merely settled, but decided correctly, and they will
change the law, sometimes again and again, to get it right.
Their direct overturning of a legal rule, when mandated by
social considerations, is just another method for adjudicating
common law cases. 55 They understand these new rules not as
"'new law but an application of what is, and therefore had been,
61 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 55-56, 58-61
(Harvard Univ. Press 1988).
52 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469
(1897). See the classic judicial exposition by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Fox v. Snow,
76 A. 2d 877,882-884 (N.J. 1950) (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting).
63 P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 287 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) !hereinafter ATIYAH & SUMMERS).
54 Warren Hoge, Lord Denning, 100, a Populist Who Enlivened British Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at All, A13.
65 EISENBERG, supra note 51, at 104-145.
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the true law.",s6 This is why common law judicial decisions are
"presumptively retrospective.,,57 The overruling court does not
"pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from
misrepresentation . . . [i]t is declared not that such a sentence
was bad law, but that it was not law.',ss
Professor Leonard Levy reveals Chief Justice Shaw to be
the paradigm of a Substantive Judge. His
infrequent use of citation--often its total absence-was
habitual. . . . Although he was duly respectful of the value of
old formulas, he was more often compelled to make them
serviceable. Consequently, his opinions give the impression
of an imperious scorn for precedent.
But it was his
conception of the law as a growing science that made him
impatient with mere authority for its own sake. He could not
content himself with precedent, well though he could
conscript it to his service when he wished. His inventive
spirit would not permit him to be the prisoner of someone
else's opinions. For him the vigor of the law depended upon
its keeping abreast of the changes wrought by human
endeavor. Therefore he constantly searched for ways to
adapt the old to the new, reconcile conflicting doctrines, and

56 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965) (quoting Shulman, Retroactive
Legislation, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 355, 356 (1934». This is
Blackstone's theory that judges do not make, but simply declare law, as opposed to
John Austin's theory that judges make law. The newer doctrine of prospective
overruling allows courts, as a matter of judicial policy, to decide whether to make a
ruling prospective only, which is usually done only when rights have vested or there
has been reliance. See S. R. Shapiro, Comment note, Prospective or retroactive
operation of overruling decision, 10 A.L.R. 3d 1371 (2005).
57 Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 228 (D.C. 2001).
58 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES *83 (emphasis in original). See
State v. Waterberry, 804 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Kan. 1991); County of Los Angeles v. Faus,
312 P.2d 680, 685-686 (Ca1.1957) ("It is the general rule that a decision of a court of
supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation and
that the effect is not that the former was bad law but that it never was the law.");
Peerless Electric Co. v. Bowers, 129 N.E.2d 467, 468 (Oh. 1955) (per curiam) ("The
general rule is that a decision of a court of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former
decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former was bad
law, but that it never was the law."). Forty years ago, Robert Keeton wrote that "[tlhe
notion that judges are engaged in merely finding law rather thal·l making it is now
thoroughly discredited. But, to paraphrase a familiar observation about another dead
letter of the law, this discredited notion still rules us from its grave." Robert E. Keeton,
Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 Tx. L.
REV. 1254, 1265 (1966) (citation omitted). As set forth supra in notes 51 and 52, the
notion is not as discredited as Keeton thought.
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59

Substantive Judges who try to achieve important societal
goals such as economic growth, national unity, or the health or
welfare of a community are known as "Policy Judges." They
value what is good. On the other hand, "Principle Judges"
value what is right. They may borrow principles from religion,
ethics, economics, politics, or nearly anywhere, and these
principles might range from representative democracy to the
maximization of wealth to liberty and equality. Regardless of
whether they are primarily driven by Policy or Principle, it is
clear to common law Substantive Judges that flexibility and
uncertainty are both inherent in, and central to, the common
law. 60
Professor Eisenberg claimed that "what the common law is
cannot be determined without consideration of what the
common law should be.',sl That is because there exists a
"necessary connection between the content of the common law
and [certain] moral norms, policies, and experiential
propositions ... .'062 In other words, the common law
should be, and largely is, rooted in social morality, social
policy, and human experience. Therefore, the best legal rule
to govern any issue is the rule that best reflects these three
elements, with appropriate balancing and adjustment when
they do not point in exactly the same direction. Although not
every common law rule is the best rule at any given moment,
63
over time legal rules tend toward becoming the best.

This echoes Lord Mansfield who, as Solicitor General,

59 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW 24 (Harvard Univ. Press 1957).
60 A Precedent (Principles) Judge
would act the same way as would a
Substantive Judge, except she would not adopt brand new principles, but would rely
only upon accepted principles. EISENBERG, supra note 51, at 156-159. See Martin P.
Golding, Book Review - The Nature of the Common Law, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1261,
1273 (1991).
61 EISENBERG, supra note 51, at 161. See id. at 14-42 (defining and discussing
moral norms, policies, and experiential propositions). In brief, moral norms deal with
right and wrong, policies concern good and bad, and experiential propositions are
propositions about how the world works.
62 [d. at 161.
63 Melvin Eisenberg, What Good Teachers Say About Teaching (1990), available
at http://teaching.berkeley.edulgoodteachers/eisenberg.html (last visited Dec. 10,2006).
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argued that "the common law . . . works itself pure by rules
drawn from the fountain of justice.,,64 This view is held by
common law judges who do not consider themselves bound by
existing legal rules, a group that probably includes most
American state appellate judges.65 . These judges believe that
common law structure requires them to bring any legal rule
that abridges social morality, public policy, or human
experience into harmony with modem understandings.
B.

LEGAL PERSONHOOD IS CENTRAL TO COMMON LAw

The reason personhood is central to common law is that it
determines who or what counts, and whether an entity's value
is inherent, or merely instrumental. "Things" exist for persons,
while "persons" exist for themselves. 66 "Personhood," however,
is a protean term. A century ago, John Chipman Gray
observed that "the technical legal meaning of a 'person' is a
subject of legal rights and duties.',s7 In 1997, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, noting that the state's legislature had
characterized a fetus born dead as "never to have existed as a
person, except for purposes of actions resulting from its
wrongful death," correctly stated that this "classification of
'person' is made solely for the purpose of facilitating
determinations about the attachment of legal rights and duties.
'Person' is a term of art ... .',s8
Importantly, not only is a "person" not a biological concept,
it is independent of being human. 69 Human slaves were once
things, a Hindu idol was once designated a person, while
human fetuses,70 corporations,71 and governmental entities may
64 Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.).
See Edmund Heward,
Lord Mansfield 63 (Barry Rose 1979).
65 See generally ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 53.
66 "The objects of dominion or property are things, as contradistinguished from
persons." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *16 (emphasis in original).
67 JOHN CmPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (Columbia
Univ. Press 1909).
66 Wartelle v. Womens' & Children's Hospital, 704 So. 2d 778, 780-81 (La. 1997).
69 See Ex Parte Boylston, 33 S.C.L. 41, 43 (1847); Jarman v. Patterson, 23 Ky.
644. 645-646 (1828) (concluding that a slaves' civil law personhood has nothing to do
with being human).
70 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 162 (1973) (holding that fetuses are not
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 2-3 (N.C. 1989) (holding that fetuses are not
persons within the meaning of the South Carolina homicide statute). Today every
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be persons under an array of state or federal constitutional
provisions, statutes, and common law. 72
On the other hand, "person" is commonly understood as
being synonymous with "human," which may become critical
when a court is interpreting a statute. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts invoked this synonym when it
interpreted that state's vehicular homicide statute, which
prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle so as to cause "the
American jurisdiction recognizes a cause of action in tort, almost always under the
common law, for a fetus born alive who suffered prenatal injury after reaching
viability. See David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death since Roe v. Wade, 45
Mo. L. Rev. 639, 644 n.24 (1980). Some jurisdictions permit a common law cause of
action for a fetus born alive who suffered even a pre-viability injury. Eg., Sylvia v.
Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960). Others
allow either a common law or statutory cause of action in favor of the estate of
stillborns for prenatal injury that caused their deaths, with courts drawing the line at
injuries inflicted both before and after viability. See the cases collected in Farley v.
Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 n.13 (W. Va. 1995); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087
n.3. (Pa. 1985).
Courts that reject the characterization of a human fetus as a "person" may be
loathe to categorize it as a thing. See Wise, Hardly a Revolution, supra note 4, at 897.
In Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distrib., Inc. ,727 S.W.2d 504, 504-506 (Tx. 1987), the
Supreme Court of Texas held that fetuses were not "persons" under the Texas
Wrongful Death Act or Survival Statute. But the Court's entire explanation for its
rejection of the mother's alternative demand for damages for the destruction of her
chattel consisted of the statement that "we hold as a matter of law, that a fetus is not
relegated to the status of chattel." Id. at 506. If a Texas fetus is neither a person nor
property, then what is it? And what is a pre embryo, the term for a zygote until
fourteen days after fertilization? In Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992),
the Tennessee Supreme Court held both that the trial court had erred in holding that
preembryos were persons and that the Tennessee Court of Appeals had erred in
assuming they were property. Id. at 596-597. The Tennessee Supreme Court,
however, did not have the Texas Supreme Court's luxury of simply dictating what an
entity was not and refusing to instruct us what they were, as the fates of living
Tennessee preembryos had to be decided. The Court held that preembryos "occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for
human life," but that the parties had "an interest in the nature of ownership to the
extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the
preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law." Id. at 597. It is not clear how this
"interest in the nature of ownership" differs from a property interest and to what
"special respect" the pre embryos themselves were thereby entitled. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona, after holding that a three-day pre embryo was not a person
for the purpose of the Ari20na wrongful death statute, adopted the Tennessee Supreme
Court's designation of the pre embryo as occupying some interim position between
property and person. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic, 121 P.3d 1256, 1261 (2005).
71 Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (holding that
corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution).
72 Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C.L.
REV. 1231, 1239 (1992).
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death of another person.'073 The court stated, "'In construing a
statute, words are to be accorded their ordinary meaning and
approved usage.',,74 Therefore, "In keeping with approved
usage, and giving terms their ordinary meaning, the word
'person' is synonymous with the term 'human being.',,75
This Massachusetts case illustrates why the word "person"
in statutes, which are ordinarily construed according to
common definitions, might easily have a different meaning
than it has in the common law, where it often designates an
entity as the subject oflegal rights and duties. 76 The long bitter
struggles over the personhoods of human fetuses, black slaves,
and corporations have not been contests over whether these
entities are human. That is a question of biology. Instead they
concern whether these entities ought to have legal rights and
therefore inherent value under civil law and if so, what rights
they should have. 77
Precisely because it determines who lives and who dies,
who may be enslaved and who may not, who counts and who
does not, legal personhood is the most important individual
issue that can come before a common law court. Any common
73 Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) (construing Mass. Gen.
Laws c. 90, sec. 24 (g».
74 Id. at 1325 (quoting Hashimi v. Kalil, 446 N.E.2d 1387, 1389 (Mass. 1983)
(determining whether a viable fetus was a "person"».
75 Id. See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695,697 (D.
Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) (confronting the novel issue whether American Indians were
"persons" or "parties" within the meaning of the Federal Habeas Corpus Act). The
Court pointed to Webster's, which "describes a person as 'a living soul; a self-conscious
being; a moral agent; a man, women, or child; an individual of the human race,'" and
noted that "the first section of the Revised Statutes, declares that the word 'person'
includes partnerships and corporations," and found the writ was available to the
Indians. Id.
76 Compare Didonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. 1987) (concluding
that fetuses are persons within the meaning of the state wrongful death statute) with
State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989) (concluding that fetuses are not persons
within the meaning of the state homicide statute). The word "person" may also have a
different meaning among different statutes, even within a single jurisdiction.
77 See generally Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The
Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (2001). See also, Michael D.
Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of
Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425,
1466 (1992) (stating that in the federal constitutional arena, "[rlather than developing
a coherent, unified theory of personhood, the Supreme Court follows a result-oriented
approach. If the Court determines that a corporation should be protected by the First
Amendment, for example, the corporation is granted constitutional personhood under
the First Amendment. Personhood is thus a conclusion, not a question.").
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law judge who would deny a legal thing the power to argue that
changes in moral norms, policy, and experiential propositions
require a re-evaluation of his or her legal thinghood acts
inconsistently, unjustly, and outside the structure of the
common law. The judge would make the most important
common law rule the only one permanently unavailable for
judicial re-examination.
This is not how the common law operates in the United
States. If it were, human fetuses would not be common law
persons for the purpose of injuries suffered in utero in every
American state. 78 In 1884, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., sitting
on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, deprived
fetuses of common law personhood after finding they were
merely a part of their mothers. 79 Virtually every American
state high court took his lead; but twentieth century science
would prove them all wrong and each court later reversed
itself. so When its turn came, the New York Court of Appeals
asked, "[S]hall we bring the common law of this state, on this
question, into accord with justice? . .. [A]s New York State's
court of last resort, we should make the law conform to right."sl
Borrowing from a British court, it said "'[w]hen the ghosts of
the past stand in the path of justice clanking their mediaeval
chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them
undeterred.",s2 Those judges believed they had "not only the
right, but the duty to re-examine a question where justice
demands it" and to "bring the law into accordance with present
day standards of wisdom and justice rather than 'with some
outworn and antiquated rule of the past."'S3 Judges, they said,
acted "in the finest common-law tradition" when they adapt

7B This is how federal constitutional law, which is not common law, operates.
Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421,1426 (D. Md. 1994); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa. 1978), affd., 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980). See WISE, RATI'LING THE CAGE,
supra note 4, at 107-118 (discussing how the evolution of the common law personhood
for human fetuses occurred). This evolution is entirely separate from the decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) to deny human fetuses personhood under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
79 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
BO See WISE, RA'ITLING THE CAGE, supra note 4, at 107-114. The Holmes case is
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
Bl Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691,692 (N.Y. 1951).
B2 [d. at 694 (quoting United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclay Bank, Ltd., AC. 1, 29
(1941)).
B3 [d. (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933)).
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and alter prior cases "to produce common-sense justice."s4 Any
other outcome was "harsh" and would merely "do reverence to
an outmoded, timeworn fiction.,,85
C.

THE LEGAL THINGHOOD OF CHIMPANZEES SHOULD ALWAYS
BE SUBJECT TO COMMON LAw REEVALUATION

Chimpanzees have a colorable, even a powerful, claim to
treatment as legal persons whose fundamental interests in
bodily liberty should be protected by basic legal rights. 86
Accelerating shifts in social morality and social policy, coupled
with accreting human experience, and especially scientific
investigation, are strengthening the argument for chimpanzee
legal personhood. 87 A 2001 public opinion poll revealed that
most Americans (eighty-five percent) believe, and correctly so,
that chimpanzees have "complex social, intellectual, and
emotional lives. "s8 Most (fifty-one percent) believe chimpanzees
should be "treated similar to children, with a guardian to look
after their interests," as opposed to being treated either as
human adults (nine percent) or as property (twenty-three
percent). 89
Accompanying the 2005 publication of the
chimpanzee genome in Nature was a commentary that urged
"special ethical responsibilities towards captive great apes"; it
suggested that "the study of great apes should follow ethical
principles generally' similar to those currently used on human
subjects who cannot give informed consent.,,90
This
commentary was strongly endorsed by the Chimpanzee
Sequencing and Analysis Consortium.
These were the
scientists who sequenced the chimpanzee genome.
They
Id .
85 Id. at 695 (quoting Woods v. Lancet, 105 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (App. Div. 1951)
(Heffernan, J., dissenting».
86 See generally ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra
note 3; WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 5; Nussbaum, supra note 3; Tribe, supra
note 3; Verchick, supra note 3; WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 4; Wise, Hardly a
Revolution, supra note 4.
87 See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scientific
investigation.
88 Zogby Poll 5, Question 3 (interviews conducted between April 24-27, 2001)
[hereinafter Zogby Poll) (on file with author).
89 Id . at 9, Question 15.
90 Pascal Gigneux et al., The ethics of research on great apes, 437 NATURE 27,28
(Sept. 1, 2005). See also Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, supra note
29, at 83.
8'
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pointedly chose to ignore an accompanying commentary by
members of the United States National Chimpanzee Resource
Committee that perversely interpreted the termination of
chimpanzee biomedical research around the world, often on
ethical grounds, as a major reason for ramping up chimpanzee
research in the United States. 91
Public policy is shifting. The 1985 amendments to the
United States Animal Welfare Act required the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate minimum requirements for "a
physical environment adequate to promote the psychological
well-being of primates," thereby implicitly recognizing that
nonhuman primates have psychologies deserving of
protection. 92
Congress enacted the Chimpanzee Health
Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act in 2000, which
allotted up to thirty million dollars a year to support a
sanctuary system in the United States in which hundreds of
"surplus' chimpanzees" could retire. 93 Congress also enacted
legislation to assist the conservation of wild chimpanzees.94
I have sought so far to establish that there is an inherent
flexibility in the structure of the common law that allows its
judges to re-evaluate each and every legal rule. I also have
demonstrated how the conferred legal status of "person" is a
mandatory prerequisite to having an entity's interests
considered in the civil law. It is therefore my position that
common law judges have a duty at least to consider the claims
of a "thing" that it ought to be considered a "person."
In the next section I shall consider what common law
causes of action might be most appropriate when a chimpanzee
seeks to establish its fundamental common law right to bodily
.1 VandeBerg et aI., supra note 14, at 32. E.g., Supplementary Note to the Home
Secretary's Response to the Animal Procedures Committee, Interim Report on the
Review of the Operation of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act of 1986, at 2 (1997)
(on file with author) (stating that "Great apes ... have never been used under the 1986
Act as laboratory animals. But this has not previously been banned. The Government
will not allow their use in the future. This is a matter of morality. The cognitive and
behavioural characteristics and qualities of these animals means it is unethical to treat
them
as
expendable
for
research."),
Interim
Report
available
at
http://www.apc.gov.uk/reference/ar97.pdf(last visited Dec. 10,2006).
• 2 7 U.S.C.A. § 2143(a)(2)(B) (West 2006) .
• 3 42 U.S.C.A. § 287a-3a (West 2006).
'4 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-05 (West 2006). Congress included gibbons within the
statute's delmition of great apes. See Charles Siebert, Planet of the retired apes, N. Y.
TIMES MAG., July 24, 2005, at 29. There are no surplus American populations of
gorillas and orangutans.
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liberty. I have chosen two ancient, and very powerful, common
law writs, the writs of habeas corpus and de homine
replegiando. Each has a long and storied history of protecting
the fundamental human interest in bodily liberty. They have
protected even the interests of unfree humans who were
classified as legal things, such as English villeins and black
slaves. I argue that these two writs should accordingly be
available to chimpanzees to challenge their legal thinghood as
they attempt to vindicate their fundamental interests in, and
common law right to, bodily liberty.95
III. SLAVERY AND VILLEINAGE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
William Blackstone wrote, "Under the Saxon government,
there were a sort of people in a condition of downright
servitude, used and employed in the most servile works, and
belonging, both they and their children and effects, to the lord
of the soil, like the rest of the cattle or stock upon it. "96 Saxon
slaves, post-Conquest villeins, and black slaves, from the time
of the first Queen Elizabeth, were treated as chattels personal
or real estate under English, and later American, law. 97 No
legal status existed between slave and free; one was either free
or slave. 98 "Civiliter mortuus" ("civilly dead"), these slaves were
"things" that lacked every personal right, including the right to
institute litigation. 99 But procedures eventually evolved by
which even they could challenge their legal status in a court.
No one is sure where English human slavery originated or
when it appeared, but we know that English Christians were
enslaving one another by early Anglo-Saxon times. Slaves
95 Liberty is a non-comparative right. Other, perhaps lesser, requirements exist
for the award of personal (or bodily) liberty as a comparative equality right.
96 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *92-*93.
97 THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW 1619-1860 61-80 (Dniv.
of North Carolina Press 1996); A. Leon Higgenbotham, Jr. & F. Michael
Higgenbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free": Legal Barriers Against and Options in
Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1222-1223 (1993)
(stating that at different times, Virginia treated black slaves as personal chattels or
real estate). See also Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 561 (1851) ("Property in the
bondsman, was as absolute as in cattle or other stock.").
98 A. Leon Higgenbotham, Jr. & Barbara Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity
Second: The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 Omo
ST. L.J. 511, 534, 535, 538 (1989).
99 E.g., Peter v. Hargrave, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12, 14-17 (1848) (emphasis in
original).
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could be bought, sold, and exported and the practice was never
questioned. 100 Under a Saxon law modeled on Roman law,
those enslaved due to war, criminal conviction, or accident of
birth were deemed chattels; any wrong done them was
perpetrated legally against their owners. By the tenth century,
Saxon law allowed human slaves a few legal privileges, while
continuing generally to treat them as things. Their legal
thinghood was reflected in an agreement between Saxons and
Celts that set out replacement values in the event of a
nonhuman animal's loss. Both a human slave and a mare were
worth twenty shillings.
As late as 1086, the Domesday Book recorded that between
ten percent and twenty-five percent of Anglo-Saxons were
slaves. The conquering Normans had no tradition of chattel
slavery and believed freemen could more efficiently develop
their newly won lands and increase the rents Norman
landlords received. Therefore, they set about freeing English
slaves. By the beginning of the twelfth century, only a handful
of slaves, owned by the Catholic Church, remained. In 1102,
the Council of Westminster formally outlawed the human slave
trade, declaring, "[N]o one is henceforth to presume to carry on
that shameful trading whereby heretofore men used in
England to be sold like brute beasts."lol
Though Saxon chattel slavery disappeared within sixty
years of the Norman Conquest, many English remained
villeins: "Villeins constituted the major portion of the English
population as recorded in Domesday Book.,,102 There were two
kinds of villeins: villeins regardant, those attached to land, and
villeins in gross, those attached to the persons of their lords.
Disagreement exists about the extent to which villeins were
chattel slaves. loa One mid-thirteenth century judicial opinion
\00 lowe my brief discussion of medieval English slavery primarily to DAVID A. E.
PELTERET, SLAVERY IN EARLY MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE REIGN OF ALFRED
UNTIL THE TwELFl'H CENTURY (London 1995) [hereinafter PELTERET].
101 [d. at 78.
102 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 39
(Cornell Univ. Press 1966) [hereinafter DAVIS]. In the twelfth century, Evesham Abbey
had "five slaves and bondswomen. Then thirty-twO'villeins." PELTERET, supra note
100, at 239.
103 Compare
JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 325
(Hambledon Press 2000) [hereinafter BAKER] ("the villein was not a slave in the Roman
sense, nor was he owned by his lord ... ") with 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 491, 495 (1956) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH] ("[M]any of the rules and
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reported "[e]arls, barons and free tenants may lawfully ... sell
their [villeins] like oxen or cows," and the plea rolls contain
evidence of many sales of villeins. 104 Lord Holt, Chief Justice of
the Court of King's Bench at the turn of the eighteenth
century, disliked black chattel slavery, however, and didn't
think villeins were slaves: "one may be a villein in England,
but not a slave.,,105 The slaveophilic Georgia Supreme Court
agreed, stating that "any analogy drawn from the ville[i]nage of
the feudal times, is utterly fallacious.,,106 Villeins might have
been owned by their lord, but they still had privileges that
black chattel slaves never had, such as the right to marry. At
worst, they were owned outright by their lords, but had legal
rights against every other person in the world. 107
While a Saxon slave's hope of freedom was limited to
voluntary manumission or escape, a villein might improve his
legal status in ways unavailable to slaves. He could do so
through his lord's conduct, residence in certain cities or
boroughs for a year and a day without the lord making a claim,
or by ordination, knighthood, marriage, and other means.
Blackstone noted that villeins "could not leave their lord
without his permission; but if they ran away, or were purloined
maxims of the Roman conception of property were applied to them. Their lord had
absolute power over their bodies and their goods. He could sell them and treat them as
he pleased; for they were his chattels.").
\04 PAUL R. HYAMS, KING, LORDS AND PEASANTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE
COMMON LAw OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 2-3
(Oxford Univ. Press 1980) [hereinafter HYAMS] (quoting THE LONDON EYRE OF 1244
(H.W. Chew & M. Weinbaum eds., 1970».
\05 Smith v. Brown and Cooper, (1701) 91 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B.).
106 Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 199 (1853).
107 DAVIS, supra note 102, at 38, 39; 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 491, 495;
Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 199 (1853) ("[W]here his lord was not concerned, a villein
was a freeman in all his dealings.").
Some would wish to deny to the unfree villein any legal rights. Is he not
rightless almost by definition? Maitland, indeed, said of the villein: "In relation
to his lord, the general rule makes him rightless [while] criminal law . . .
protects him in life and limb . . .. Maitland would call a slave 'rightless' even
when his life was legally protected against his master's violence. After all,
modern English law protects domestic animals against maltreatment without
giving them any legal right of redress against their masters. This view, though
not beyond argument, seems sensible enough. Clearly an object, dog or villein,
may be protected by the law without having the ability to initiate itself legal
proceedings to enforce that protection.
HYAMS, supra note 104, at 125-126 n.3 (citations omitted) (noting that Glanville may
also have "thought in terms of an analogy between villeins and domestic animals").
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from him, might be claimed or recovered by Action, like beasts
or other chattels.,,10B
As the common law presumption in favor of liberty
evolved, it became increasingly difficult to prove that someone
was a villein. Unless one confessed to being a villein in court,
it had to be proven that one had descended from villein stock,
unbroken by illegitimacy, from time out of mind. Some have
suggested that a villein might once have directly initiated a
lawsuit to establish his status as free; others claim that this
right, if it ever existed, had disappeared by 1302, perhaps by
109
1230. Later, the writ of de homine replegiando permitted the
villein to test his legal status.
Common law writs evolved for use by a lord that might
lead to the adjudication of a villein's legal status. The writ of
naifty was used by lords as far back as the early twelfth
century to commence suits to determine whether a claimed
villein was, or was not, free. no During the thirteenth century, a
lord who claimed a villein might sue in a county court, then
deliver a writ of naifty to the sheriff. If the alleged villein then
claimed he was free, the sheriff and county court lost
jurisdiction and the case went to a royal court. To continue the
litigation there, the lord had to obtain a pone de nativis or the
alleged villein had to obtain a writ de liberate probanda, also
called a writ monstravit.
Until 1351, when Parliament
severely weakened it, the writ monstravit allowed the alleged
villein to remain free during the pendency of a proceeding that
could last several years. III In his celebrated argument to the
Court of King's Bench in the 1772 case of Somerset v. Stewart,
barrister Francis Hargrave observed that the common law
courts placed the burden of proof upon the lord whenever the
freedom of a villein was at issue. This was the case both with
the writ of de homine replegiando, where the villein was the
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *98.
Paul R. Hyams, The Action of Naifty in the Early Common Law, 90 L.Q. REV.
326, 333-335 (1974); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE
CONQUEST TO GLANVILLE 343-344 (1958-1959).
110 Hyams, supra note 109, at 326; 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 497.
"Naifty" was sometimes spelled "neifty" and was also called the writ de nativo habendo.
111 Hyams, supra note 109, at 327, 328-331. See Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98
Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.); 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 497. The villein's ability to
use this writ was taken away by parliament during the reign of Edward III. 25 Edw. 3,
st. 5, ch. 18 (use of the writ de libertate probanda would not prevent the lord from
seizing a fugitive villein).
108
109
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plaintiff, and the writ de nativo habendo, where the villein was
the defendant.112
Over hundreds of years jurors, increasingly aghast at the
spectacle of Englishmen exercising despotic power over other
Englishmen, began to balk at branding anyone a villein. Thus
villeinage was extirpated by the end of the sixteenth century,
not because it was ever formally abolished, for it never was, but
because the supply of villeins dried up and none were created.
The last case involving a villein was decided in 1618 with a
jury verdict favoring the villein. 113

IV. THE COMMON LAW WRIT OF DE HOMINE REPLEGIANDO
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW WRIT OF DE
HOMINE REPLEGIANDO IN ENGLAND

The common law writ of de homine replegiando is the
oldest English "freedom writ"; it appears in the Pipe Rolls by
the middle of the twelfth century.114 The writ "was a popular
and most usual remedy to obtain a release from simple
custodies," and ordered a sheriff or a private person to turn one
deprived of his liberty over to another, with the prisoner having
to post bail. l15 It evolved into the customary common law
method to try title to villeins seized by a lord using the writ de
nativo habendo. 116
Somerset, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499.
Pigg v. Caley, Noy 27 (K.B. 1618).
114 ELSA DE HAAS, ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL: ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN CRIMINAL CASES TO THE YEAR 1275 62 (AMS Press 1966) [hereinafter DE HAAs]
("[O]ne of the first records for the purchase of a writ de homine replegiando is located in
the Pipe Roll records for 1165-66.... ") (emphasis in original).
115 Maxwell Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origin of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN.
B. REV. 92, 96, 97 (1938) (citation omitted).
116 In re Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 25 (1855) (Lowrie, J., concurring).
See
Somerset, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB.); More v. Watts, (1700) 88 Eng. Rep. 1426,
1428 (K.B.). ("If a homine replegiando be brought, and the defendant claim the party as
his villein, that will be a good return for the sheriff to make; and there shall be no
replevin till plaintiff give security, and that in Court; and then there shall go a writ ...
to the sheriff to deliver the plaintiff . . . .") (emphasis in original). See also BAKER,
supra note 103, at 332; 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 497, 498; HERBERT BROOM,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw VIEWED IN RELATION TO COMMON LAw 76 n.x (George L.
Denman ed., 2d ed. 1885); PHINEAS PEMBERTON MORRIS, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF REPLEVIN IN THE UNITED STATES 238 (2d and rev. ed. 1869) [hereinafter
MORRIS] ("It was a good return to a homine replegiando to say that the defendant
claimed the man as villein, but upon the return of the writ to the court, if any persons
112

113
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De homine replegiando is a species of replevin. It is the
right to possession that usually beats at replevin's heart.l17
There was, Chief Justice Holt wrote, "no diversity between a
homine replegiando and a common replevin for cattle."llB De
homine replegiando "borrows all that belongs to a replevy of
goods."1l9 Blackstone wrote "[t]he writ of de homine repleg:'ando
lies to replevy a man out of prison, or out of the custody of any
private person (in the same manner that chattels taken in
distress may be replevied ... )."120
The conceptual distinction between the two kinds of
replevin has not been that common replevin applies to
nonhumans and de homine replegiando applies to humans.
Generally common replevin applied to legal things, while de
homine replegiando applied to legal persons; humans
occasionally fell into both categories. 121 Together, common
replevin and de homine replegiando were intended to occupy
the entire field of replevin, to include all things and every
came into the court and gave security to have the plaintiff in court at a day certain, a
writ issued to the sheriff to deliver the plaintiff ... .") (emphasis added).
117 J.E.
COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAw OF REPLEVIN AS
ADMINISTERED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 7, 16 (2d ed. 1900).
118 More v. Watts, (1700) 88 Eng. Rep. at 1427 (emphasis in original).
119 Huger v. Barnwell, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 273, 275 (1852).
See MORRIS, supra
note 116, at 237 ("[TJhe proceedings upon the homine replegiando were very much the
same as in the common cases of replevin for goods.") (emphasis added). Morris devoted
a chapter of his 1869 treatise on the law of replevin to de homine replegiando because,
at one time, "replevin was the principal remedy for an illegal imprisonment" and it was
being used in the United States. Id. at 236.
120 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *129. See MORRIS, supra note 116,
at 68. See also DE HAAS, supra note 114, at 67-68 ("[TJhe writ de homine replegiando
was obtained 'as of course' from the Chancery for releasing on surety anyone whom a
sheriff or a private person had seized and was detaining as a prisoner.") (citation
omitted).
[De homine replegiandoJ was, in substance, the process of replevin, applied to the
purpose of rescuing a person from imprisonment. Just as chattels unlawfully
distrained could be recovered by their owner by the action of replevin, so a
person unlawfully detained could recover his liberty by this writ. Since it
appears in Bracton, it is at least as old as the earlier half of the thirteenth
century. It was directed to the sheriff, and ordered him to replevy a man who
was in prison, or who was detained in the custody of some person named in the
writ.
9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 105 (citations omitted).
121 Cowperthwaite v. Jones, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 55 (1790). See also Dallin H. Oaks,
Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 284 (1965)
[hereinafter OaksJ. Lord Mansfield occasionally wielded the writ of habeas corpus in
similar way. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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person wrongfully detained. Admittedly, there were occasional
perverse and theoretically unsuppo;. table uses of the writ of de
homine replegiando in cases brought by antebellum American
masters seeking to reclaim wayward slaves. But judges should
have required those masters to assert the claim of common
replevin instead.
With a small number of irrelevant exceptions, common
replevin was meant to encompass "all species of animate,
inanimate, tangible, mov[e]able property.,,122
It primarily
addressed the right to possess, which was often a part of the
right to own, a legal thing by a legal person, a right that was
inherent in such relationships as between man and plough,
man and ox, and man and slave. 123 On the other hand, de
homine replegiando generally applied to self-ownership, which
was a legal person's right to demand freedom from bodily
restraint. Legal historian Frederick Maitland remarked that
"the . . .connection between Replevin and Liberty is obvious,"
and further declared that "when a man is wrongfully deprived
of his liberty he ought to be replevied.,,124 This harmonized well
with John Locke's seventeenth century claim that each human
had "a Property in his own Person.,,125 Along with Thomas
Hobbes, Locke trumpeted "possessive individualism," the idea
that a human could own an attribute such as individual liberty
in the same way he might own property.126

122

COBBEY, supra note 117, at 41. See also 66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin §6 at 503

(2001).
123 As to human slaves, see, e.g., Gullett v. Lamberton, 6 Ark. 109, 117 (1845).
The common law writ of detinue also applied to slaves. See Lay v. Lawson, 23 Ala. 377
(1845); Bethea v. McLennon, 23 N.C. 523 (1840). Detinue and replevin could both be
invoked to recover wrongfully detained chattels to which the plaintiff had a right to
possession, but replevin lay when the original taking was unlawful, while detinue was
appropriate when the original taking was lawful. 1 C.J. Actions §120 (1914).
124 F.M. Maitland, The History of the Register of Original Writs, 3 HARv. L. REV.
167,219,217 (1889-1890).
125 JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287, 269 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (emphasis in original). The Report on the Trial by
Jury in Questions of Personal Freedom of the Massachusetts House of Representatives
questioned whether the Founders had intended to "yield [trial by jury] as a right to
every man for the investigation of his title to an ox or horse, and withhold it on a trial
which involved the ownership ... of himself?". COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT ON THE TRIAL BY JURY IN QUESTIONS OF PERSONAL
FREEDOM, H.R. Doc. NO. 51, 7 (Mass. 1837) [hereinafter MAsS. HOUSE REPORT]
(emphasis in original). See also David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50
DUKE L. J. 473, 481 n.29 (2000).
126 C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM-
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The writ of de homine replegiando generally allows for the
immediate release of someone seeking to replevy oneself to
freedom. 127 However, by the middle of Blackstone's century,
numerous exceptions and lengthy procedures had attached to
the writ. These made the more efficient habeas corpus to
become the writ of choice for most of those illegally detained. 128
But the writ de homine replegiando continued to remain viable.
In 1758, John Eardley Wilmot, a justice on the Court of King's
Bench and a future Chief Justice of the Court of Common
Pleas, wrote that once a proper affidavit was laid before a
court, if a writ of habeas corpus was inappropriate, "the case is
not a remediless one: by the common law, the writ of 'homine
replegiando' will clearly relieve him," as a writ of right. 129
A writ de homine replegiando holds one great advantage
over the writ of habeas corpus. 130 Unlike habeas corpus, de
homine replegiando allows for jury trials. 13l In 1786, Chief
Justice McKean of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recommended that a freedom suit originally brought on behalf
of a black slave as a writ of habeas corpus be changed into a
writ de homine replegiando so that a jury could decide the
question of freedom. 132 Antebellum Northern abolitionists
understood this "advantage of a jury trial to persons who were

HOBBES TO LOCKE 3 (1962). The idea of "possessive individualism" preceded both
Locke and Hobbes by at least three hundred years. TUCK, supra note 18, at 3, 16-29.
127 Oaks, supra note 121, at 281. Oaks says the writ applied neither to wards nor
villeins. [d.
.
128 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *129.
See procedures described in
Oaks, supra note 121, at 281-282. See also Cohen, supra note 115, at 97 ("it was
circumscribed by so many exceptions on its face that it could not be used for the most
important imprisonments as in felonies, or by special command of the King, or his
Chief Justiciar; and it was probably used only in cases of private detentions or
breaches of the peace not amounting to felony.") (citation omitted).
129 Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng Rep. 29, 31, 49 (Answer
of Mr. Justice Wilmot to the questions proposed to the Judges by the House of Lords,
on the second reading of the bill, [entitled), An Act for giving a More Speedy Remedy to
the Subject, upon the Writ of Habeas Corpus). "That writ, which is obtained out of the
Court of Chancery upon an affidavit, goes to the sheriff, and commands him to replevy
the man. If he cannot replevy him, he returns it, and a process goes out instantly to
seize the body of the person who is supposed to have him in custody, and he is
imprisoned himself till he produces the body." [d. at 49.
130 One commentator, believing de homine replegiando a more effective remedy
than habeas corpus, encouraged its use. Anonymous, Some Defects in the Law of
Habeas Corpus, 22 LAW. REV. 149 (1855).
131 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 31 (4th ed. 1840).
132 Belt v. Dalby, 1 U.S. 167 (Pa. 1786).
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at a significant disadvantage under the prevailing law but who
could count on the sympathy and support of a predominant
portion of the community .... "133 The enslaved might prefer a
writ, such as habeas corpus, that promised summary release.
But they would settle for one, like de homine replegiando, that
held out the possibility of a slower but more certain release
from servitude.
B.

THE WRIT OF DE ROMINE REPLEGIANDO AND HUMAN
SLAVERY IN AMERICA

The writ of de homine replegiando was incorporated into
the law of the American Colonies and, later, the American
states with the rest of English common law. 134 "The use of the
133

Oaks, supra note 121, at 282.

Abolitionists found this antique writ useful in rescuing negros from slave
catchers in the northern states. It was also technically available to slaveowners
seeking to recapture their human chattels, but one procedural feature of the writ
nullified its utility for southerners: issues raised by the writ were triable by jury,
and few northern juries in the 1850s sympathized with slave catchers.
William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, 36 J. S. HIST. 530, 535 (1970).
134 Many states have specifically incorporated the common law of England and/or
English statutes into their state law. ALA. CODE § 1-3-1 (2005) (common law has no
date); ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (2005) (common law has no date; statutes are from
Mar. 24, 1606); CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (2005) (common law has no date); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2-4-211 (2005) (common law has no date; statutes are prior to the fourth
year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third
Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of thirtyseventh Henry the Eighth); DEL. CaNST. SCHEDULE, § 18 (2005) (common law as of
1776); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (2005) (common law and statutes prior to July 4, 1776);
GA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-10 (2005) (common law as of May 14, 1776); HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1
(2005) (common law has no date); IDAHO CODE § 73-116 (2005) (common law has no
date); 5 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 5011 (2005) (common law has no date; statutes are prior to the
fourth year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 43d
Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry
Eighth); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-2-1 (2005) (common law has no date; statutes are prior
to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, except the second section of the sixth
chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the
ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry the Eighth); Ky. CaNST. § 233 (2005) (all laws in
effect in Virginia on June 1, 1792; common law has no date; statutes are from July 4,
1776); MD. CaNST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. V (common law has no date; statutes
are prior to July 4, 1776); MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VI (2005) (common law and
statutes that modified it before the adoption of the Massachusetts constitution in
1780); Commonwealth v. Rowe, 153 N.E. 537 (Mass. 1926); MISS. CaNST. art. VI, § 146
(2005) (common law has no date and is used as a guide); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2005)
(common law has no date; statutes are prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the
First); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-109 (2005) (common law has no date); NEB. REV. STAT. §
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writ . . . seems to have been relatively widespread,,135 in
America with "most state courts deriv[ing] their power to issue
the writ from the common law.,,136 In its pure common law
form, the writ de homine replegiando was used in Colonial
Massachusetts by freedom-seeking blacks; its post-Revolution
statute helped streamline the writ's archaic procedures. 137 In
49-101 (2005) (common law has no date); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.030 (2005) (common law
has no date); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 90 (the common law, and English statutes in
amendment of it that were in force in New Hampshire upon the organization of the
provincial government); N.J. CONST. art. XI, § 1, p. 3 (1947) (common law as of 1776);
N.M. STAT. § 38-1-3 (2005) (states that the common law will be in effect, but courts
have interpreted this to mean English common law in effect on July 4,1776); Browning
v. Estate of Browning, 3 N.M. 659, 684 (1886); OR. CONST. art. XVIII, § 7 (2003); 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1503 (2005) (the common law and statutes of England in force on May
14, 1776); R.I. GEN. LAws § 43-3-1 (2005) (no reference to the common law; English
statutes introduced prior to the Declaration of Independence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-150 (2004) (common law has no date); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (2005)
(common law has no date); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200 (2005) (common law has no date).
Other states refer generally to "the common law" being incorporated into the law of the
state. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.010 (2005); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 1-201 (2005); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-109 (2005); MICH. CONST. art. III, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 4-1 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-03 (2005); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2
(2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-23 (2005); TENN. CONST. art. XI § 1; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 68-3-1 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.l, § 271 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.010 (2005);
WIS. CONST. art. XIV, § 13 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-101 (2005). No such statute
or constitutional provision exists for Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, or
Louisiana. However, all but civil law-influenced Louisiana incorporated English
common law and statutes through judicial decision. Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn 168
(1851); Colley v. Merrill, 6 Me. 50, 55 (1829); Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R.R.
Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201, 205-206 (1854); Congdon v. Congdon, 200 N.W. 76, 82
(Minn. 1924) (not deciding whether it was the common law in effect at the time of the
Revolution or at the time of the Adoption ofthe Northwest Ordinance of 1787).
135 Oaks, supra note 121, at 283.
136 THOMAS D. MORRIS. FREE MEN ALL-THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780-186111 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974) [hereinafter MORRIS].
137 E.g., Margaret v. Muzzy (1768) (Middlessex Inferior Ct.) (Cambridge); 2 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, Case. No. 40, 58 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds.,
1965). Cf Oliver v. Sale, Quincy's Reports 29 (1762) (in which counsel for two blacks
argued the defendant, by selling his clients into slavery, exposed himself to a writ of de
homine replegiando). See also 1 Mass. Gen Laws. ch. 58 (1786). After commissioners
appointed to recommend wholesale revisions of the Massachusetts General Laws wrote
that habeas corpus "furnishes so complete and effective a remedy for all cases of
unlawful imprisonment or restraint that the writ de homine replegiando is very seldom
used" in 1834, the writ was abolished the following year. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, pt. 3, 220 (1834). It was abolished perhaps "in inadvertence, or, any
rate, without adequate consideration," perhaps as a sop to the South. MASS. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 125, at 7; see also MORRIS, supra note 136, at 64-65. New York
retained the writ's traditional cumbersome procedures. See Skinner v. Fleet, 14 Johns
263, 268-269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817); Covenhoven v. Seaman, 1 Johns Cas. 23, 24 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1799).
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1837, a Massachusetts House of Representatives report stated
that if "a master recaptured someone who was not his slave,
"he would be liable to relinquish his custody of such person on
the process of habeas corpus or the writ de homine
. d o. ,,138
rep l egwn
From the Republic's early days, the writ de homine
replegiando was used in at least six other states, Maine,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Mississippi, and
Virginia.
Likewise,
"In
Massachusetts,
New
York,
Pennsylvania and especially in Maine, the writ was apparently
very familiar to lawyers," and "seems to have been used for
virtually every purpose for which habeas corpus was
employed," including criminal commitment, civil arrest,
military service, parent-child, child custody, and masterapprentice disputes. 139
In 1823, a South Carolina federal court, replying to the
claim that the writ de homine replegiando "is not to be raked
up from the ashes of the common law to be now first used
against the state of South Carolina," observed that it was
"ingrafted by law into the jurisprudence of South Carolina; nor
is it unknown in actual practice in cases to which it is
applicable. In the state of New York it is familiarly used.,,140 In
1834, Chancellor Halworth, on the New York Court for the
Correction of Errors, explained that, when the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793 was enacted,
the common law writ of homine replegiando, for the purpose
of trying the right of the master to the services of the slave,
was well known to the laws of the several states, and was in
constant use for that purpose, except so far as it had been
superseded by the more summary proceeding by habeas

MASS. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 125, at 20 (emphasis in original).
Oaks, supra note 121, at 283-284 n.219 (1965). "The writ [of de homine
replegiandol existed as a part ofthe common law; and ... needed no formal enactment
to give it force in the colonies." MASs HOUSE REPORT, supra note 125, at 6. I do not
generally discuss the cases hl which state writs of de homine replegiando were trumped
by federal fugitive slave laws. See, e.g., Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1834); Wright v. Deacon, 5 Sergo & Rawle 62 (Pa. 1819).
140 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 497 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4366)
(internal quotations omitted). The court also said the writ of de homine replegiando
was available even ifthe writ of habeas corpus was not. Id.
138

139
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141 .

The following year, a New York federal court, holding the
writ of de homine replegiando pre-empted by a federal fugitive
slave law, conceded that "[t]he writ de homine replegiando is ..
. adapted to try the question of slavery, and though nearly
obsolete, this court cannot deny to the party the right of
· t01
' t . . . . ,,142
reso rt mg
Maine supplemented its common law of de homine
replegiando with a statute substantially copied from
Massachusetts and aimed at those "imprisoned, restrained of
Oliberty, or held in duress.,,143 A later version was held to lie
"in favor of a person unlawfully deprived of his liberty, and it
must be prosecuted in his own name and for his own benefit.,,144
Pennsylvania reports contain numerous examples of the writ's
use. 145 In 1817, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a black who claimed
to be free, since the case had been heard by another court. But
paraphrasing England's Justice Wilmot, the court noted, "[T]he
party is not without remedy, as he may resort to a homine
replegiando.,,146
In 1847, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justice issued a writ de homine replegiando to a sheriff holding
a suspected fugitive black slave on order of the Philadelphia
Court of Quarter Sessions. 147
Most Southern courts, however, were unenthusiastic about
141
142

Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507527 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1835).
In re Martin, 16 F. Cas. 881, 882 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1835) (No. 9154) (emphasis

added).
1821 Me. Laws ch. 66 (1821).
144 Not only would it not have applied to a master seeking to recover his slave, it
did not apply to "a party to recover one, who owes him service by contract," including
an infant and an apprentice. Richardson v. Richardson, 32 Me. 560, 563 (1851). See
Bridges v. Bridges, 13 Me. 408, 411 (1836) ("It has been inquired, what shall a master
do, if his apprentice is taken away by his father? It is a sufficient answer, that a writ
for replevying the person, is not the proper remedy ... [T]here is no doubt but any
unlawful imprisonment or detention of a minor child, may be open to inquiry upon
habeas corpus.") (emphasis in original).
145 E.g., Butler v. Delaplaine, 7 Sergo & Rawle 378 (Pa. 1821); Alexander v.
Stokeley, 7 Sergo & Rawle 299 (Pa. 1821); Wilson v. Belinda, 3 Sergo & Rawle 396 (Pa.
1817).
146 Ex Parte Lawrence, 5 Binn. 304, 304 (Pa. 1817) (emphasis in original).
De
homine replegiando, however, "seems to have been available to slaves and slaveowners
on the same basis." Oaks, supra note 121, at 284.
147 In re Brown (unreported), in SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN CASES 78 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1985).
143
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leaving a freedom writ lying in their midst for a black slave to
invoke. The writ's power to restore a petitioner to immediate
liberty caused both antebellum Southern judges and
legislatures to disfavor, narrow, and even abolish it.148 Some
Southern judges claimed the writ had fallen into a fatal disuse,
permanently superseded by the writ of habeas corpus and other
causes of action. 149 The South Carolina Supreme Court,
believing the writ was "calculated to be extremely mischievous
to one who turns out to be really the master," found it had been
entirely supplanted by that state's Freedom Suit Act. 150 The
Virginia Court of Appeals noted that:
Anteriour to [the Virginia Freedom Suit Act of 1795], the
habeas corpus and de homine replegiando were resorted to by
[black] slaves asserting a right to freedom; but as these
remedies proved vexatious and unsafe [in other words, they
worked], a new proceeding was prescribed by the act ... the
homine replegiando was repealed, and the habeas corpus was
. t e. 151
conSI'dered as no Ionger approprIa

C.

A CHIMPANZEE IS ENTITLED TO USE THE COMMON LAW
WRIT OF DE ROMINE REPLEGIANDO TO CHALLENGE HIS OR
HER LEGAL THINGHOOD

We have seen that the seminal common law freedom writ
of de homine replegiando was long available for use by villeins
and black slaves to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.
While some might claim that this writ is obsolete, it is not. It
has merely been overshadowed by other remedies, especially
the more efficient writ of habeas corpus. But the writ of de
homine replegiando continues to exist, and is available if the
14S E.g., MISS. COMPo STATS. 1802-30, § 8, at 664; 1814 VA. ACTS § 314, at 68.
Massachusetts abolished the writ in 1835, perhaps because the legislature accepted the
claim of the Commissioners appointed to revise the general laws that the writ of
habeas corpus "furnishes so complete and effectual a remedy for all cases of unlawful
imprisonment or restraint, that the writ de homine replegiando is very seldom used,"
or perhaps because it was temporarily capitulating to Southern pressure to eliminate
it. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE
THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE COMMONWEALTH, pt. 3, at 229 (1834). See also
MORRIS, supra note 136, at 64-65; MASS. REV. STATS. 1836, ch. 111, § 38.
149 Huger v. Barnwell, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 273,274 (1852).
150 [d. at 275.
151 De Lacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 438, 439 (1836) (emphasis in original).
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152

usual remedies are not.
A similar argument of obsoleteness was rejected by a
United States District Court in 1879 when American Indians
sought to use the federal statutory writ of habeas corpus for the
first time. The Government claimed that
this is the first instance on record in which an Indian has
been permitted to sue out and maintain a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court and therefore the court must be
without jurisdiction. . .. This is a non sequitur. . .. It
cannot D... be fairly said that because no Indian ever before
invoked the aid of this writ in a federal court, the rightful
authority to issue does not exist. Power and authority
rightfully conferred do not necessarily cease to exist in
consequence of long non-user. Though much time has
elapsed, and many generations have passed away, since the
passage of the original habeas corpus act D... it will not do
to say that these Indians cannot avail themselves of its
beneficent provisions simply because none of their ancestors
153
ever sought reliefthereunder.

Even if a court did determine that the writ de homine
repZegiando had become obsolete, that would be true only with
respect to humans, who have an array of powerful causes of
action from which to choose. But the common law is only now
arriving at the point where it might be plausible-on morality,
policy, and experiential grounds-for a chimpanzee petitioner
successfully to invoke the writ of de homine repZegiando by
appealing to the same arguments that gave captive humans
the power to use it when they had no other remedy.
The writ therefore remains available to be invoked by a
chimpanzee petitioner claiming to be unlawfully detained in
any jurisdiction that originally incorporated the common law of
England and which has not repealed the writ either by statute
or through judicial action. Even if a court determines that the
chimpanzee is a thing being lawfully detained, that is no
reason for prejudging that ultimate issue and denying the
chimpanzee petitioner the capacity to use the writ de homine
152 Similarly, even though common law equality has been overshadowed by the
equality mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it
still exists. See WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 4, at 295 n.n6.
153 United States ex rei. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879) (No. 14,891)
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replegiando in the first place.
A chimpanzee, like any other petitioner who files a writ of
de homine replegiando, would be entitled to have the merits of
his case decided by a jury. Much as it once was more
advantageous for a black slave seeking her freedom to file a
writ of de homine replegiando and demand a trial by jury than
it was for her to seek a writ of habeas corpus, it may be more
prudent for one representing a chimpanzee to file a writ of de
homine replegiando than to seek a common law writ of habeas
corpus. Both black slave and chimpanzee were, and likely
would be, at a "significant disadvantage under the prevailing
law," with both able to "count on the sympathy and support of a
predominant portion of the community."154
This was true in the Northern states before the American
Civil War. It would probably be true throughout the United
States as we enter the twenty-first century, where the average
American appears to be further evolved in her thinking about
the legal status of chimpanzees than is the average judge.
Recall that a 2001 public opinion poll revealed that fifty-one
percent of Americans believe that chimpanzees should be
"treated similar to children, with a guardian to look after their
interests," with only twenty-one percent reporting that
chimpanzees should be treated as property.155 Thus the writ de
homine replegiando may turn out to be just as "extremely
mischievous," just as ''vexatious and unsafe" to the masters of
chimpanzee slaves, as it once was to the masters of black slaves
in antebellum South Carolina and Virginia. As the September
2005 Brazilian decision demonstrates, sympathetic judges
exist. 156
V.

THE COMMON LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN
ENGLAND

It is "[t]he most celebrated writ in the English law," said
Blackstone, and "[t]he most fundamental legal right" in the

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See Zogby Poll, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
156 See In Favor ofSuica, supra note 1.

154
155
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Anglo-American law canon. 157 Wide ranging, penetrating,
immune to technical challenge, and available in both common
law and statutory forms, the writ of habeas corpus remedies
every illegal restraint, public or private, wherever and however
it may occur. It began humbly, as a common law writ intended
to secure the appearance of one who had ignored a tribunal's
repeated summonses. Its antecedents can be found in the
eighth century, when Anglo-Saxon tribunals required an
accused to appear to pay wergeld, the price of a life or injury. If
the accused thrice disregarded this summons, then ignored a
fine for contempt, the scoftlaw could be distrained of his
property, possibly imprisoned, or even killed, if he resisted. 15s
Near the end of the eleventh century, William the Conqueror
introduced a writ that commanded county sheriffs to summons
a party to court. A century later, Henry II's expanded writ
ordered sheriffs to bring accuseds before a court. 159
By the mid-thirteenth century, judges were using the writ
of habeas corpus ad respondendum ("have the body to answer")
to have recalcitrant defendants brought before them. 160 At that
time, Bracton wrote that a sheriff might be ordered to produce
anyone who three times failed to obey a summons. 161 The
courts of the time also sought to compel an appearance before
them by seizing lands, "quod distringat eum per omnes terres ..
. Et quod habeat corpus . ... (to distrain him of all [his] lands
and [in this way] have [his] body)," and eventually devised the
capias to assist. 162 Courts began to use the writ of habeas
[57 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *129; DAVID CLARK & GERARD
McCoY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT: HABEAS CORPUS IN THE
COMMONWEALTH (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) [hereinafter CLARK & MCCOY). See also,
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.
L. REV. 143, 143 (1952).
[58 William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983, 984-85 (1978). The Perpetual Edict in
Justinian's Digest has the praetor summoning before him the freeman unlawfully
detained by means of a writ called de homine libero exhibendo ("produce the person").
See Albert S. Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 55, 56
(1934).
[59 Duker, supra note 158, at 988-989.
[60 Cohen, supra note 115, at 107-08.
[6[ 1 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAws AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 474-77
(Travers Twiss ed., 1878).
[62 Duker, supra note 158, at 994, 996 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). These
two writs were distinct. The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus was simply to
produce a body, while the capias was intended to be used to arrest and detain. See id.
at 997-1002; Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa: The Emergence of the
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corpus ad respondendum in other ways, too, such as to order a
sheriff to assemble a jury.163 At this time, the writ of habeas
corpus had nothing whatsoever to do with justifying an
unlawful detention. Instead it was "aimed at persons not in
custody, but at large" or at initiating a proceeding; it was
"essentially a technique for getting something done which the
ordinary processes of the courts apparently had been unable to
,,164
d o.
Not later than the beginning of the fourteenth century,
prisoners began to join the writ of habeas corpus to the writs of
certiorari or audita querela, and later, to the evolving writ of
privilege. 16s A writ of certiorari brought a prisoner's case from
an inferior to a superior tribunal, sometimes from a lower
common law court to a higher court, more often from a common
law court to the Chancery. The accompanying writ of habeas
corpus brought the prisoner's body into court.
This
combination evolved into the writ of habeas corpus cum causa,
by which prisoners, whether detained by private or public
persons, could have themselves brought from an inferior to a
superior court in order to inquire into the lawfulness of their
detention. 166 It would become a formidable weapon in the
Modern Writ-I, 18 CAN. B. REV. 10, 11 (1940) .
163 Duker, supra note 158, at 994, 1000.
See, e.g., Y.B. Hill. 12 Rich. II pI. 18
(1388).
164 Cohen, supra note 162, at 11; Cohen, supra note 115, at 110, 116.
165 Duker, supra note 158, at 1012-15 (stating that the writ of privilege developed
to allow those specially associated with Parliament, the King ministers, and the
officers and clerks of the Royal Courts to be tried before those tribunals); Cohen, supra
note 162, at 14. See, e.g., Y.B. Mich. 17 Edw. III foI. 37, pI. 9 (1344) (habeas corpus was
combined with audita querela [the process used by a defendant for relief against an
adverse verdict)); Edward Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L. Q. REV. 64,6972 (1902). A writ of privilege allowed one with some special connection to a court to
have a proceeding brought against him heard by that court. Cohen, supra note 162, at
16-17.
166 Williamson v. Lewis, 39 Pa. 9, 27 (1861); Y.B. Trin. 24 Edw. III, foI. 27, pI. 3
(1351). See WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 4 (2d ed.
1893) (stating that as far back as Henry VI (1422-1461), the cum causa was "used as a
means of relief from private restrain."); Hurd, supra note 16, at 131. It has also been
noted that
[B)y the end of the sixteenth century, the Habeas Corpus ad respondendum--the
form used "when a man hath a cause of action against one who is confined by the
process of some inferior court," was distinct from the Habeas Corpus ad
subjiciendum et recipiendum-the form used when a person was detained on a
criminal charge; and a little later the form ad fasciendum et recipiendum became
appropriated to the case where a defendant in a civil action, in an inferior court,
wished to remove the action into a superior court.
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hands of courts jockeying for power against other courts, for
example, the Chancery, Ecclesiastical, Requests, High
Commission, and Admiralty Courts against the Courts of
King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, and by superior
against inferior common law courtS. 167
The cum causa form of the writ of habeas corpus was
addressed to judges of an inferior court; its ad subjiciendum
("to submit to" or "to undergo") form was addressed to someone
who was detaining an applicant. By combining these two
writs, as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century,
habeas corpus began to take on a more modern look and
function as an independent writ. It soon began to detach from
other writs and "ceased to be a mere command to deliver the
body and became instead a command to have 'with cause.',,168
This was partially a result of the long power struggle between
the common law courts and the Sovereign with his Privy
Council. 169 Thus, in 1587, the Court of Common Pleas could
order a prisoner's release when the return to the writ of habeas
corpus cum causa merely stated that the prisoner was being
held "per mandatum Francisci Walsingham" Elizabeth's I's
· f spymast er. 170
ch Ie
However, there were limits to the habeas corpus power of
the court against the Sovereign. As late as the famous Five
Knights Case of 1627, England's most prominent lawyers would
argue unsuccessfully that certain knights ordered imprisoned
by the King's Council for refusing to pay taxes should be
released, or even that a cause of their detention should be
specified. 171 An aroused House of Commons responded with a
9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 91, at 111 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
167 ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 4-7 (2nd. ed. 1989); Duker,
supra note 148, at 1002-25; Cohen, supra note 162, at 16-25.
168 Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa: The Emergence of the Modern
Writ-II, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172, 197 (1940). See also Neil Douglas McFeeley, The
Historical Development of Habeas Corpus, 30 Sw. L. J. 585, 586-88 (1976); Cohen,
supra note 162, at 19, 28, 32. Cohen refers to the writ as corpus cum causa ad
subjiciendum. [d. at 35.
169 Cohen, supra note 162, at 19-25.
170 Hellyard's (or Hillyard's) Case, (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P.).
Later, when
returns declared a prisoner held by special order of the Sovereign or on authority of the
entire Privy Council, a prisoner he often remained. Duker, supra note 158, at 1026-30.
171 Also called Darnel's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (1627). For discussions of the case
see Sharpe, supra note 167, at 9-13 and Church, supra note 166, at 4-8. Sharpe writes,
"It is, perhaps, fair to say that on the strictly legal arguments, the court could have
easily come down on either side, and that the political pressures and, perhaps, the
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Petition of Right, Clauses five and eight of which complained
that subjects were being imprisoned without cause being
shown, and that when they were brought before the court by
writ of habeas corpus "there to undergo and receive" what the
court would order (a reference to habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum et recipiendum), "no cause was certified, but that
they were detained by your Majesty's special command .... "172
The Commons did "humbly pray . . . that no freeman, in any
such manner . . . be imprisoned or detained. . . ,,173 The
Petition of Right did receive the Royal assent.
The following year, the Privy Council, then the Star
Chamber, imprisoned a London Merchant for speaking
insolently to the Privy Council. Twice the Court of King's
Bench ordered his release on a writ of habeas corpus.
Chambers' Case confirmed that the writ of habeas corpus had
assumed a role greater than the protection of the jurisdiction of
common law courts.
Indeed, questioning the validity of
commitments, previously an incidental effect of the writ, began
to become its major object. In Professor Duker's judgment, "It
was at this point ... that the writ of habeas corpus embarked
upon its journey as 'the highest remedy in law, for any man
that is imprisoned."'174
Parliament went on to enact the Habeas Corpus Act of
1641. This statute declared that anyone imprisoned by a court,
the King, or his Privy Council could have a writ of habeas
corpus in either the Courts of King's Bench or Common Pleas.
political convictions of the judges, tipped the scale in the King's favour." Sharpe, supra
note 167, at 13. See also Cohen, supra note 162, at 37-39. Cohen believed
the importance of habeas corpus was that it had been made the basis for the
attack upon an imprisonment commanded by the King himself and had proven a
quick method ... to have one so imprisoned brought before a competent tribunal
and there have himself charged and heard and the legality of the detention
argued and adjudged.
Id. at 38.
172

3
Car.
I,
ch.
1,
§
5
(1628),
auailable
at
http://www.constitution.org/eng/petright.htm (last visited Dec. 10,2006).
173 3 Car. I. ch.l, § 8 (1628). This was not so much a statute, as a declaration of
existing law. Sharpe, supra note 167, at 13-14.
174 Duker, supra note 158, at 1035 (emphasis added) (quoting Proceedings in
Parliament Relating to the Liberty ofthe Subject, (1628) 3 How. St. Tr. at 59, 154). See
Cohen, supra note 162, at 28 ("the most significant development of the writ in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries [was) the rise of the habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum and the use of the writ to test the validity of every imprisonment." Ad
subjiciendum means "'to submit to' or 'to undergo.'")
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The custodian of the prisoner would be ordered to ''bring . . .
the body of the . . . party so committed . . . and . . . likewise
certify the true cause of such ... imprisonment, and thereupon
the court ... shall proceed to examine and determine whether
the cause of such commitment ... be just and legal .... ,,175 In
1670, upon just such a writ of habeas corpus, Chief Justice
Vaughan, of the Court of Common Pleas, ordered the release
from the Tower of London of those brave jurors who had
insisted upon acquitting William Penn after being expressly by
the trial judge warned against doing so. Vaughn proclaimed
that "[t]he Writ of habeas corpus is now the most usual remedy
by which a man is restored again to his liberty, if he have been
against law deprived of it.,,176 Of course, some judges still had
ways of avoiding or delaying the production of detained
prisoners, ordering them onto ships bound for distant lands,
refusing to entertain writs filed when courts were in their
frequent vacations, and by imposing high bails.177 These, and
other abuses, led to the passage of The Habeas Corpus Act of
1679, England's most renowned statute, said by Blackstone to
be "another magna carta.,,178
This Act was intended to remedy these defects, and even to
allow third persons to seek writs of habeas corpus on behalf of
detainees.
However, it was not intended to reach
imprisonments ordered by the House of Commons or
noncriminal detentions. 179 Nor was it intended to supplant the
175 16 Car.
1, ch. 10. Presumably this referred to the habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum.
176 Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (C.P.) (emphasis added).
177 See Cohen, supra note 168, at 181-184; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at
120.
178 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMME!I.'TARIES *135.
179 See Case of the Sheriff of Middlesex, (1840) 113 Eng. Rep. 419, 424 (Q.B.).
Cohen, supra note 168, at 186 n.133 ("'civil detentions' ... is intended to include not
only those cases where there is an imprisonment under execution or like process at the
suit of a party, but those cases of private detentions as well as commitments by bodies
not being courts of law, yet having power to commit."). In 1816, the statutory writ was
extended to private custody, which the common law writ already covered. 56 Geo. III,
ch. 100 (1816).
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[als early as the 17th
century, the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 authorized complaints to be filed by
'anyone on ... behalf of detained persons, see 31 Car. II, ch. 2, and in 1704 the House
of Lords resolved '[Tlhat every Englishman, who is imprisoned by any authority
whatsoever, has an undoubted right, by his agents, or friends, to apply for, and obtain
a Writ of Habeas Corpus, in order to procure his liberty by due course of law.' See
Ashby u. White, 14 How. St. Tr. 695, 814 (Q. B. 1704)." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
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common law, for the common law writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum "has a much broader scope than . . . the Habeas
Corpus Act; for it may issue in all sorts of cases .... "lBO Yet
even in circumstances not covered by the Habeas Corpus Act,
"when the writ was afterwards issued at common law, [the
courts] adopted in practice, so far as the same were applicable,
the provisions of the [1679 Act]."lB1 Writs of habeas corpus now
began regularly to issue to secure the release from
"imprisonment by private persons, or from imprisonment on
other than a charge of crime."lB2
Because many continued to perceive deficiencies in the
writ of habeas corpus, especially naval impressments, in 1758
the House of Commons voted to amend the 1679 Act. 1B3 But the
bill foundered on the implacable opposition of Lords Mansfield,
Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, and Hardwicke,
Lord Chancellor. In what Horace Walpole described as "the
only speech, which, in my time at least, had real effect: that is,

149, 161-62 (1990). Private detentions are not normally remedied by the federal writ of
habeas corpus in the United States. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1427 n.3 {Paul Bator et al. eds., 2d ed. 1973}.
This Act made the writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum the most effective
weapon yet devised for the protection of the liberty of the subject, by providing
both for a speedy judicial inquiry into the justice of any imprisonment on a
criminal charge, and for a speedy trial of prisoners remanded to await trial.
9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 118. Justice Wilmot acknowledged that some
claimed the 1679 Act permitted writs of habeas corpus to be issued against private
detentions, but "I must say they never read the Act if they thought so." Opinion on the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 40. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES *137.
180 Williamson v. Lewis, 39 Pa. 9, 29 (1861) ("Much perplexity has arisen in many
minds from confounding [the common law writ] . . . with the statutory writ, and
therefore it is important to distinguish them."). This refers to the Pennsylvania
Habeas Corpus Act of 1785, which was similar to the English Habeas Corpus Act of
1679.
181 Hurd, supra note 20, at 199, 208. "After the [Glorious) Revolution, the efforts
of the legislature to improve the writ of Habeas Corpus were seconded by the judges.
In fact the judges have always been ready ... to interpret the rules of the common law
and the statute law in such a way that they made for the greater efficiency of the writ."
9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 122 (emphasis in original).
182 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 103, at 119. See Church, supra note 166, at 70
{stating that at common law, the writ of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal
imprisonment, whether claimed under public or private authority."}; Hurd, supra note
20, at 87.
183 Sharpe, supra note 167, at 68; Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758)
97 Eng. Rep. 29, n.{a}3.
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convinced many persons,"184 Lord Mansfield argued:
that people supported it from the groundless imagination
that liberty was concerned in it, whereas it had as little to do
with liberty as the Navigation Laws or the act of encouraging
the cultivation of madder; that ignorance on subjects of this
nature was extremely pardonable, since the knowledge of
particular laws required a particular study of them; that the
greatest genius without such study could no more become
master of them than of Japanese literature without
understanding the language of the country; that the writ of
habeas corpus at common law was a sufficient remedy
against all those abuses which bill was supposed to rectify.ls5

While the bill was pending, the House of Lords sent ten
questions about the current law of habeas corpus to all the
Royal Judges. Justice Wilmot's lengthy response still provides
the most comprehensive description of the law of habeas corpus
ad subjiciendu in existence from near the time of the American
Revolution. Wilmot maintained that the common law of habeas
corpus reached private detentions but that the Act of 1679
applied only to criminal commitments and not to illegal
pres sings into military service. ls6 Habeas corpus was not a civil
action, he insisted, but a "remedial mandatory writ" by which a
judge commanded the production of one claiming to have been
184 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUsCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 6 (Vniv. of North Carolina Press 1992)
(quoting Legal Observer (Dec. 1835).
185 5 COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 900 (1809) (emphasis
added).
186 Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. at 33-38, 42.
Justice Wilmot said:

When [the writ of habeas corpus] was first applied to relieve against private
restraints, does not appear; but whenever it was, the manner of issuing it seems
to have been adopted from that of the writ of homine replegiando, which was the
true common law remedy for the assertion of liberty against a private person:
and the writ never issued of course, but was applied for by petition ... and an
affidavit made, disclosing the foundation on which it was prayed.
[d. at 37. The writ of habeas corpus ... seems by practice to have been substituted in
[de homine replegiando's] place ... ." [d. at 38. "The writ of homine replegiando ...
was the only specific remedy provided by the common law, for the protection and
defence of his liberty, against any private invasion of it." [d. Blackstone wrote that a
writ of de homine replegiando "lies to replevy a man out of prison, or out of the custody
of any private person (in the same manner that chattels taken in distress may be
replevied ... ) upon gibing security to the sheriff that the man shall be forthcoming to
answer any charge against him." 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *129.
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unlawfully imprisoned. He further stated, "It is a writ of such
a sovere.ign and transcendent authority, that no privilege of
person or place can stand against it. It runs, at the common
law, to all domirllons held of the Crown. It is accommodated to
all persons and places."ls7
The writ did not issue as a matter of course, Wilmot wrote,
because many imprisonments were lawful. Once these had
included detentions in religious prisons and under the yoke of
villeinage; now restraints could lawfully be imposed by
husbands upon wives, fathers upon children, guardians on
wards, and masters on apprentices. Others might be legally
detained as a result of being bailed, while paupers could be
lawfully confined to hospitals and workhouses and madmen
could be held pursuant to properly-issued commissions of
lunacy. ISS But any petitioner who could demonstrate probable
cause through verified affidavit that his or her detention was
unlawful was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus as a matter of
right, and no court could legally deny it.1s9
B.

SOMERSET V. STEWART-THE PARADIGMATIC USE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON BEHALF OF A BLACK SLAVE

On November 28, 1771, one the world's most significant
petition for a writ of habeas corpus arrived at the chambers of
Chief Justice of King's Bench Mansfield. 190 In his capacity as a
member of the House of Lords thirteen years before, Lord
Mansfield had played an important role in blocking the House
of Commons from extending the reach of the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679. How he grappled with the demand by friends of
J ames Somerset for his freedom remains a landmark in the
struggle for human and nonhuman liberty.191
Two hundred and thirty-three years later, in 2004, the
United States Supreme Court would characterize Lord
Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. at 36.
Id . at 36, 37.
189 Id. at 32,36,37. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *132. See also
Hobhouse's Case, 1 St. Tr. N.S. App. 1346 (1820); Hurd, supra note 20, at 224 n.3
(citing In the Matter of Winder, 2 Clifford, 89). Here, a writ of habeas corpus resembles
the writ of de homine replegiando. Id. at 33.
190 See Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
191 I tell James Somerset's story in STEVEN M. WISE, THOUGH THE HEAVENS MAY
FALL: THE LANDMARK TRIAL THAT LED TO THE END OF HUMAN SLAVERY (Da Capo Press
2005).
187

188
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Mansfield's judgment as "releasing on habeas an Mrican slave
purchased in Virginia and detained on a ship docked in
England and bound for Jamaica"; the Court footnoted this
characterization to the following sentence: "At common law,
courts exercised habeas jurisdiction over the claims of aliens
detained within sovereign territory of the realm.,,192 But thirtyyear-old James Somerset was not your run-of-the-mill "alien."
Kidnapped at age seven, sold to a Scotsman, Charles Steuart,
in Virginia, Somerset· was quite arguably Steuart's chattel in
Britain, liable to being bought, sold, leased, mortgaged, and
inherited like any other chatteL He was unquestionably
Steuart's property under Virginia law. 193
Somerset's petition was probably filed by his godparents,
for at that moment, the Mrican was shackled aboard the "Ann
and Mary," then preparing to weigh anchor for Jamaica, where
he was to be sold into hard labor in the sugarcane fields as
punishment for insulting and escaping from Steuart in London.
Lord Mansfield would not have been eager to order this habeas
corpus. Locked in a years-long, very public conflict with the
determined abolitionist, Granville Sharp, over the legality of
human slavery in England, Lord Mansfield had that very
afternoon finally rid himself of Sharp's latest slavery case,
Lewis v. Stapylton, which had plagued him for many months. 194
Lord Mansfield could easily have rid himself of Somerset's
petition.
Mansfield might easily have questioned whether a proper
person had sought Somerset's writ. This problem presented
itself every time a master demanded the return of an
apprentice or black slave pressed into military service, for the
servant or slave had not sought the writ, and couldn't have if
he had wanted to. As in Somerset's case, some third party had
to petition for the detainee, an agent, or perhaps a friend, and
the petition had to reflect what the detained person wanted.
Wives and husbands could petition for each other, parents for
minor children, children for aged parents, guardians for wards,
brother for sister. But, except in unusual circumstances,
Rasul v. Bush, 542 u.s. 466, 482, n.ll, 481 (2004).
See generally Adele Hast, The Legal Status of the Negro in Virginia, 1705·
1765, 54 J. OF NEGRO HIsT. 217 (1969). Recent scholarship has demonstrated that
Steuart's name, "Stewart" in the reporters, was actually spelled "Steuart." I will refer
to him as "Steuart," unless I am citing to the case name.
194 WISE, supra note 191, at 59-110.
192

193
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judges usually refused to consider petitions filed by
strangers. 195 Had he been so inclined, Lord Mansfield could
have found the godparents, if that was who filed Somerset's
195 Today, "next friend" status appears fairly easy to come by under the common
law of the American states. Sharpe, supra note 167, at 222-23. However, in United
States federal courts, "next friend" status is more narrowly permitted pursuant to a
writ of habeas corpus filed under statutory authority. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 2006)
(providing that a writ may be filed not just "by the person for whose relief it is
intended" but also "by someone acting in his behalf."). See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 8.3, at 384-401 (4th
ed. 2002). In Whitmore v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court stated that
"next friend" standing

is by no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on
behalf of another. Decisions applying the habeas corpus statute have adhered to
at least two firmly rooted prerequisites for "next friend" standing. First, a "next
friend" must provide an adequate explanation-such as inaccessibility, mental
incompetence, or other disability-why the real party in interest cannot appear
on his own behalf to prosecute the action (citations omitted). Second, the "next
friend" must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose
behalf he seeks to litigate (citation omitted) and it has been further suggested
that a "next friend" must have some significant relationship with the real party
in interest. Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273, 275-276 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (minister
and first cousin of prisoner denied "next friend" standing). The burden is on the
"next friend" clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify
the jurisdiction of the court .. . And in keeping with the ancient tradition of the
doctrine, we conclude that one necessary condition for "next friend" standing in
federal court is a showing by the proposed "next friend" that the real party in
interest is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of
access to court, or other similar disability.
Limitations on the "next friend" doctrine are driven by the recognition that 'lilt
was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter
of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends.'
United States ex rei. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921); see also
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 291-292 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring with five other Justices) (discountenancing practice of granting "next
friend" standing to one who was a stranger to the detained persons and their
case and whose intervention was unauthorized by the prisoners' counsel).
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64, 165 (1990). Some lower courts have
interpreted this as setting forth a two-pronged test, or a three-pronged test, refusing to
appoint a "next friend" who lacks a "significant relationship," while leaving open the
possibility that a prisoner may have no significant relationships. Compare Ford v.
Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 624 (11th Cir. 1999) (two-pronged test) with Coalition of Clergy,
Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to appoint the
Coalition as next friend). But see Bush, 310 F.3d at 1167 ("An institution with an
established history of concern for the rights of individuals in the detainees'
circumstances-such as the Red Cross or Amnesty International-would be more likely
to be able to show that it is truly dedicated to the best interest of the detainees than a
group without that history and with more broad ranging interests and background)
(Berzon, J., concurring); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F. 3d 598, 604 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002)
(three-pronged test) (refusing to appoint the Public Defender, while reserving "the case
of someone who possesses no significant relationships at all.").
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petition, mere strangers.
Significantly, Lord Mansfield issued the writ of habeas
corpus and eventually freed James Somerset, despite the
adverse return of the ship's captain, John Knowles. Knowles
stated that Somerset had been a slave in Africa, that he had
been brought from Africa as a slave, that in the American
Colonies and in Jamaica slaves such as Somerset were
"saleable and sold as goods and chattels and upon the sale
thereof have become and been and are the slaves and property
of the purchasers thereof and have been and are saleable and
sold by the proprietors thereof as goods and chattels," that
Somerset had been duly sold to Steuart, and (four times)
described Somerset as Steuart's "negro slave and property.,,196
The manner in which Lord Mansfield had described his
earlier use of habeas corpus to pry pressed black slaves from
Royal Navy ships in the recently-dispatched Lewis case
appeared promising, if ambiguous, yet problematic for James
Somerset. In open court, Lord Mansfield had stated that, "I
have granted several writs of habeas corpus upon affidavits of
masters for their Negroes, two or three I believe, upon
affidavits of masters deducing sale and property of their
Negroes upon being pressed. I have granted habeas corpus to
deliver them to their masters .... ,,197
Lord Mansfield was here simultaneously repudiating one
form of forcible detention, naval impressment, while
reinforcing another, chattel slavery. Granville Sharp thought
Lord Mansfield's use of the writ to free blacks from
impressment entirely admirable, "[a] clear acknowledgment
from his Lordship of the illegality of pressing ... [and] very
proper relief from that illegal oppression.,,198 This apparently
meant that Lord Mansfield believed that pressed black slaves
possessed the liberty that habeas corpus was meant to protect
and intended to grant relief against their wrongful

196 This manuscript of Somerset's trial is on microfilm in the custody of the New
York Historical Society. All quotes refer to that manuscript. The original Somerset
habeas corpus petition and supporting affidavits were lost in an early twentieth
century housecleaning at the British Public Records Office.
197 Lord Mansfield's statement and Granville Sharp's reactions and observations
about this can be found in a manuscript in the possession of the New York Historical
Society, entitled A Report of the Case of Lewis (A Negro) ago Stapylton, with remarks by
G. Sharp [hereinafter Sharp].
198
Id.
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impressment.
Yet Lord Mansfield's statement was internally
inconsistent. In one breath he claimed that he employed the
writ to return pressed blacks from the navy to any masters who
could prove their "sale and property."199 But a writ of habeas
corpus did not then, and does not today, permit a judge to order
the return of property; it only allows a court to remedy a
deprivation ofliberty.20o Granville Sharp believed that this use
of habeas corpus "to deliver up a poor wretch, against his will,
into the hands of a tyrannical master, who rates him merely as
a chattel, or pecuniary property, and not as a man," made the
Chief Justice "guilty of a three-fold injury.,,201 Such conduct
would "deprive the country of a useful sailor," "cruelly injure
the poor negro himself, by dragging him from the King's service
[in which he was content] in order to deliver him up, against
his will, into the hands of a cruel private tyrant," and injure
English law "by perverting a constitutional writ to purpose
entirely opposite to its original use, meaning, & intention!,,202
Lord Mansfield's use of the writ of habeas corpus to assist
masters in retrieving their pressed slaves was as improper as
Sharp claimed. It also presaged the occasional abuse of the
writ de homine replegiando by masters in antebellum America
to regain their slaves. Lord Mansfield should have required
masters to use another writ, permits a writ of common replevin
instead, rather than turn the writ of habeas corpus from an
instrument of liberty to one of oppression. 203
Lord Mansfield's return of pressed slaves to their masters
was odd in another way. Writs of habeas corpus usually set
pressed apprentices free; they were not returned to their

WISE, supra note 191, at 94-95.
CLARK & MCCoy, supra note 157, at 47-49.
201 Sharp, supra note 197.
202 WISE, supra note 191, at 95.
203 Elvira, 57 Va. 561 (1865). See Foster v. Alston, 6 How. (Miss) 406, 457 (1842)
(in a habeas corpus proceeding, "rights cannot be redressed; no damages can be
assessed, no restoration of property can be decreed, except in cases of slaves, under our
statute). Article I, §§ 9(3) and (4) of the Confederate Constitution stated that "[tlhe
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it" and "[nlo bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be
passed." During the Confederacy, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia discharged
a slave from imprisonment and delivered her to her master through a writ of habeas
corpus.
199

200
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masters, who were left with the remedy only of suing the press
gang to recover the apprentice's wages. 204 Blackstone had
equated black slaves with apprentices, slavery being "no more
than the same state of subjection for life, which every
apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or
sometimes for a longer term.,,205 Lord Mansfield treated slaves
and apprentices differently. But if a pressed black was his
master's property, Lord Mansfield should never have issued
the writ of habeas corpus. If the writ applied to a black slave's
liberty, then the return of the black to his master undermined
everything the writ of habeas corpus had come to represent.
Captain Knowles' return to the writ presented a further
problem for James Somerset. Not that many years before,
Justice Wilmot had claimed that, in a petition for habeas
corpus, judges were bound by the facts set forth in the return,
unless it "shall most manifestly appear ... by the clearest and
most undoubted proof, that such return is false in fact, and
that the person so brought up is restrained of his liberty by the
most unwarrantable means, and in direct violation of law and
justice.,,206 "Judges will construe the law as liberally as possible
204 When a father sought a writ of habeas corpus to set his son free from the
custody of his aunt, Lord Mansfield ordered the boy released, but said he could go
where he pleased; the father's rights would have to be decided through another action.
Rex v. Delaval, (1763) 97 Eng. Rep. 913, 914 (K.B.) ("[Tlhe court is bound ... to set the
infant free from an improper restraint: but they are not bound to deliver them over to
any body nor to give them any privilege.") Lord Kenyon said that a writ of habeas
corpus was improperly issued on behalf of a master to recover an illegally impressed
apprentice. King v. Reynolds, (1795) 101 Eng. Rep. 667 (K.B.). At most, the court has
discretion to make those orders it deems just. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harrison, 11
Mass. 63 (1814) (granting a writ of habeas corpus granted for an apprentice at the
instance of the master, with the apprentice being "set [] at large"). "The object [of the
writ of habeas corpusl [ils to' secure personal liberty, not to decide disputes concerning
property." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1 Sergo & Rawle 353, 356 (Pa. 1815) (noting,
however, that the court had discretion to deliver an infant to his parent or an
apprentice to his master). Hurd wrote that when a master used the writ of habeas
corpus to free his slave from illegal detention, "the slave is brought before the court
under the writ, he, as well as the apprentice or infant, must, if of sufficient capacity, be
allowed his liberty of choice, and if of tender years or insufficient capacity he must be
disposed of under the writ, as the sound discretion of the court shall dictate." Hurd,
supra note 20, at 552. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 n.32 (1963) (quoting Cox
v. Hakes, (1890) 15 A.C. 506, 527-528 (H.L.»; Secretary of State for Home Affairs v.
O'Brien, (1923) A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.) (Earl Birkenhead) ("habeas corpuS ... afford[sl a
swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement."); Foster, 7
Miss. at 459 (under the habeas corpus statute, damages may not be assessed, nor may
property, except slaves, be restored).
205 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *424-25.
206 Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 29,42.
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in favour of liberty," he explained, "but they cannot make
laws.,,207 A judge should demand that the captor "[t]ell the
reason why you confine him," and then "determine whether it
is a good or bad reason; but not whether it is a true or false
one.,,208 According to Captain Knowles' return, James Somerset
was undoubtedly Charles Steuart's slave.
Ontario Court of Appeals Justice and habeas corpus
scholar, Robert J. Sharpe, has noted that Justice Wilmot was
but one of ten sitting Royal judges who responded to the House
of Lords' 1758 request for answers about the writ of habeas
corpus.
Of the nine other judges who delivered opmlOns . . . five
thought that the return could be controverted. A sixth judge,
unable to actually deliver his opinion, also took this more
liberal view.
In addition, Lord Mansfield strenuously
opposed the bill because he thought the law already
207

[d. at 48. However, Justice Wilmot continued, a case involving a false return

is not a remediless one: by the common law, the writ of 'homine replegiando' will
clearly relieve him. That writ, which is obtained out of the Court of Chancery
upon an affidavit, goes to the sheriff, and commands him to replevy the man. If
he cannot replevy him, he returns it, and a process goes out instantly to seize the
body of the person who is supposed to have him in custody, and he is imprisoned
himself till he produces the body.
[d. at 49. Justice Wilmot also noted "[t]here is another method by which a man
impressed [into the military] may get at his liberty, laying the gaoler and the return
quite out of the case: and that is, by appealing to that summary jurisdiction, which the
Court of King's Bench exercises over all inferior jurisdictions, powers, and authorities
whatsoever." [d.
208 [d. at 43.

The writ is not framed or adapted to litigating facts: it is a summary short way
of taking the opinion of the Court upon a matter of law, where the facts are
disclosed and admitted ... if the facts are controverted they must go to a jury;
and when the return to a habeas corpus is made and filed, there is an end of the
whole proceeding, and the parties have 'no day' in Court; and therefore it is
impossible that a proceeding, by way of trial, should be grafted upon it ..

[d. at 43. Justice Wilmot also said that
You have asked a question; you shall take the answer as it is given you: if it is
sufficient in point of law, the Judges will give you instantaneous relief; if it is
false in fact, you have received an injury; vindicate yourself against that injury
by an action, and when you have proved the fact to be false, you will be entitled
to a complete relief.

[d. at 44. This was to preserve the right to try disputed facts before a jury. In 1816,
the Act of 1679 was amended to extend to those restrained in private custody and
judges were permitted to inquire into the truth of the facts in the return. 56 Geo. III,
ch. 100 (1816). See Church, supra note 166, 228-31,249; Hurd, supra note 20, at 86.
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209

Moreover, "Even by Wilmot's time ... there were several
situations in which the courts did consider questions of fact on
habeas corpus.,,210 Justices not infrequently examined the facts
behind illegal naval impressments and Lord Mansfield had
gone so far, in a case in which the petitioner claimed to be held
illegally in a madhouse, to have her inspected by physicians
and relatives. 211 In 1810, abolitionists would seek a writ of
habeas corpus from the Court of King's Bench on behalf of the
South African, Saartjie Baartman, alleging she had been
imported into England to be exhibited against her will. 212 That
Court ordered her orally examined by a coroner and lawyer, in
the absence of her keepers, to determine whether she was in
£'.
lact cons ent'mg. 213
According to Justice Sharpe, the common law rule against
controverting the return to a petition for habeas corpus by
determining facts did not exist because of a concern for
trespassing upon juries. "[T]he common law rule may be
regarded as an assertion that habeas corpus was not to take
the place of trial by jury for the ultimate determination of guilt
or innocence. This, however, did not prevent the courts from
determining certain factual issues which did arise.,,214 Judges
could avoid any rule against controverting the return in a
number of different ways. For one, they could examine facts
consistent with the return that undercut the reasons given for
the imprisonment, so-called "Confessing and Avoiding" the
return. 215 Courts could also require a respondent to show cause
why a prisoner should not be released after a return was
filed. 216 Another option was to decide ''jurisdictional facts," such
209 Sharpe, supra note 167, at 66 n.16 (citations omitted). Justice Sharpe is "the
best contemporary authority on the scope of the writ." CLARK & MCCoY, supra note
157, at 5.
210 Sharpe, supra note 167, at 66 (emphasis added).
211 Id. at 66 and nn.14, 15.
212 See generally The Case of the Hottentot Venus, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 344

(K.B.).

See id.
Sharpe, supra note 167, at 65.
215 Id . at 67.
216 "The significant aspect of this reasoning is that it indicates that the
prohibition against controverting the return was a purely technical matter, and could
be avoided so long as an actual return was not involved." Id. at 68.
213
214
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as "whether or not the person or thing in question comes within
the class upon which its powers may be exercised," or facts that
are "logically prior to a determination of the main issue, and
such issues [which] are collateral to the issue that the tribunal
is asked to decide ultimately.,,217 Courts even could order a
factual dispute to be tried. 218
short, Sharpe concludes there
were "many ways around the rule which have been used since
Wilmot's time and before .... "219
Viewed in this jurisprudential context, it is clear that
while Lord Mansfield's decision to free James Somerset on a
writ of habeas corpus was courageous and innovative, it was
not the radical whimsy of a maverick justice acting
unilaterally. Nor did it just fall from the sky. Rather, it was a
logical application of existing understandings of habeas corpus,
rooted in the historical underpinnings of the common law, and
applied in precisely the same manner that many other judges
had long been granting the freedom writ in other
circumstances. The common law's structural framework and
precedent pointed the way; all Lord Mansfield did was connect
the dots as he believed justice demanded. The Somerset
decision is all the more important given Lord Mansfield's
general conservativism and prior hostility to the idea of
freedom for black slaves.
Though acutely aware of the
potentially enormous economic interests in favor of preserving
human slavery in England, he could no longer deny these
rightless beings the most important judicial tool necessary to
question their captivity. Hence, Lord Mansfield's famous quote
in open court on the hearing day previous to that on which he
rendered his decision, "Fiat justicia, ruat coelumi" (Let justice
be done, though the heavens may fall).220
By granting a writ of habeas corpus to a legal thing named
J ames Somerset, Lord Mansfield catalyzed the fight to human
slavery in Britain. At the least he made the legally invisible
become visible for the first time, granted individual black

In

217
218

1d. at 72.
1d. at 78.

219 ld. at 71 (citation omitted). Accord Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417 n.27 (1963)
("In making provision for the trial of fact on habeas ... the Act of 1867 seems to have
restored rather than extended the common-law doctrine of the habeas judge. For it
appears that the common-law doctrine of the incontrovertibility of the truth of the
return was subject to numerous exceptions.") (citation omitted).
220 WISE, supra note 191, at 173-74.
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slaves their long-sought ability to challenge the legitimacy of
their bondage, and ultimately helped to move an entire class of
beings from the category of rightless thing to legal person.
C.

THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND BLACK SLAVERY IN
AMERICA

After World War II, one scholar deemed the prohibition
against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus "[t]he most
important human rights provision in the [United States]
Constitution.,,221 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court
even extended the reach of the writ to foreigners interned at
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, reaffirming that habeas corpus was
"'a writ antecedent to statute, ... throwing its root deep into
the genius of our common law.",222 According to the Court, the
writ appeared in English law several centuries ago, and
became "'an integral part of our common-law heritage' by the
time the Colonies achieved independence, and received explicit
recognition in the Constitution. ,,223
With the exception of South Carolina, the 1679 Habeas
Corpus Act was never explicitly extended to an American
Colony, unlike the common law of habeas corpus, which applied
in them all. 224 Indeed, English common law generally applied
221 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution,
32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.").
222 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 484 n.2 (1945) (internal quotations omitted)).
223 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485
(1973), and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
224 See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 115
(Greenwood Press 1980) ("The common-law writ of habeas corpus was in operation in
all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in 1776."); Milton Cantor, The Writ of
Habeas Corpus: Early American Origins and Development, in FREEDOM AND REFORMESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY STEELE COMMAGER 55, 66-67 (Harold M. Hyman &
Leonard W. Levy eds., 1967); Albert S. Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 55, 63 (1934) ("The American colonies ... always considered the
writ as one of their rights, guaranteed to them by the various charters and statutes as
to native-born Englishmen .. "
Generally, during colonial history, the writ was
granted without question."); A.H. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM.
HIST. REV. 18, 19-21, 26 (1903) ("In conclusion, it may be added that the rights of
colonists as regards the writ of habeas corpus rested upon the common law with the
exception of South Carolina, which reenacted the English statute. "). The December 11,
1705 diary of Massachusetts Bay Colony judge Samuel Sewell records he issued a writ
of habeas corpus under the common law. Massachusetts Historical Society Collections,
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in every American Colony, while every royal charter but
Pennsylvania's expressly protected common law rights. 225
Thus,
By the 1680's [the writ of habeas corpus] was a familiar legal
device in all the colonies . . . [and] deeply embedded in the
interstices of colonial thought, much like the common law
itself.... Habeas corpus was the only common-law process
explicitly written into the Constitution, which is the most
complete measure of its reception by the colonists and the
high regard in which it was held. . . . Indeed, the
Constitutional delegates' vote ... had been unanimous that
"the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended. "226

Northern and Southern judges disagreed on whether
slaves could seek their freedom through writs of either habeas
corpus or de homine replegiando. Northern courts regularly
allowed blacks to challenge their enslavement through writs of
habeas corpus. 227 This was not true in the American South. On
the eve of the American Civil War, Florida's Supreme Court
refused the writ to a slave, saying:
There has not been an adjudication by the Courts of a
Southern State cited to us, nor have we been able to find
such, wherein a question of real contest as to the right of
freedom on the part of the person claimed as a slave the
Ser. 5, VI, at 147. Like South Carolina, Massachusetts enacted the 1679 Habeas
Corpus Act, but it was disallowed by the Privy Council. McFeeley, supra note 168, at
592.
225 McFeeley, supra note 168, at 591-92. However, statutes enacted after a royal
charter was granted did not apply. [d.
226 Cantor, supra note 224, at 65, 73, 74. See Hurd:supra note 20, at 122. The
motion to add the clause "unless in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it" was carried by a vote of seven states to three. [d. at 74. See also 2 Journal
of the Federal Convention Kept by James Madison 560 (E.H. Scott ed., Lawbook
Exchange 2003) (1893). Most state constitutions carried similar provisions. Hurd,
supra note 20, at 127-13l.
227 Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 193 (1836); State v. Lasselle, 1 Blackf. 60 (Ind. 1820); Respublica v. Smith, 4
Yeates 204 CPa. 1805); Respublica v. Blackmore, 2 Yeates 234 (Pa. 1797); Arabas v.
Ivers, 1 Root 92 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1784). In 1855, a United States District Court
committed Passmore Williamson to prison for refusing to obey a writ of habeas corpus
issued at the request of a master of three slaves whom Williamson had helped escape
as they passed through Pennsylvania. United States ex rei. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28
F. Cas. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16, 726).
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remedy of habeas corpus has been considered the appropriate
one to determine this question. . .. Whether, under the
circumstances of this case, [the slave's claim to freedom] may
be rightfully done through ... the writ of habeas corpus Dis
the question for our adjudication. There being, fortunately
for us, decisions made by Courts holding the same relations
with ourselves to this delicate subject, assented to and
having the sanction and approbation of the entire Southern
judicial mind and people, has relieved us of the necessity of
investigation to ascertain the entire verity of the conclusions
228
to which they have arrived.

In direct opposition to Lord Mansfield's implicit reasoning
in Somerset, Southern judges routinely rejected slaves' use of
the writ of habeas corpus on the ground it was designed to
protect and restore a right of personal liberty that slaves
utterly lacked,229 because the writ did not allow a jury to
determine property ownership,230 or it could not be used to try
title to chatte1. 231 In a stark demonstration of the value-driven
nature of law, Southern judges favored bondage no less
fervently that Northern juries leaned toward freedom for slaves
in freedom suits.
Southern judges, however, were not the only force
preventing black slaves in Southern states from using the writs
of de homine replegiando and habeas corpus to try their rights
to freedom. Many Southern legislatures, before and after the
American Revolution, enacted so-called Freedom Act Statutes.
Now universally regarded as disgraceful acts of legislation,
these statutes were intended to diminish or extirpate the power
of black slaves to challenge their bondage. They were enacted
to supplant the common law, destroy the ability of slaves to
employ common law freedom writs, and limit freedom suits to

State v. Gauthier, 8 Fla. 360, 363·64 (1859).
State v. Philpot, Dud. 46, 52, 1 Ga. Rep. 375, 378 (Super. Ct. 1831).
230 Field v. Walker, 17 Ala. 80, 81 (1849); State v. Fraser, Dud. 43, 43-44, 1 Ga.
Rep. 373, 374 (Super. Ct. 1831); Renney v. Mayfield, 5 Tenn. (4 Hawy.) 165, 165-167
(1817). The Renney court stated the plaintiff could sue for false return and, if she
prevailed through a jury, would have "a pluries habeas corpus, founded upon the
record, and shall be discharged." [d. (emphasis in original).
231 State v. Gauthier, 8 Fla. 360, 363 (1859) (stating that habeas corpus "has been
universally refused and deemed inadequate in cases ... where the effect ... would be
to deprive the party in possession ... of the right oftrial by jury."); Field, 17 Ala. at 81;
Renney, 5 Tenn. at 165.
228
229
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the strict procedures set forth in those Acts. 232 The statutes
were in no way intended to facilitate the freedom of slaves;
their purpose was to shield masters from other, often more
fruitful, legal attempts by slaves to gain their freedom.233 They
were usually held by Southern courts to provide the exclusive
means to challenge one's slave status. 234
Of the Virginia Freedom Suit Act the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia said:
Until this Act was passed, the remedy of a person held in
slavery for the recovery of his freedom, was unregulated.
The writs of habeas corpus and de homine replegiando were,
among others, resorted to. They were vexatious in their
character; and the latter has been accordingly repealed,
while the provisions in relation to the former rendered it an
objectionable and improper remedy for the trial 0 the right of
a slave to his freedom. Therefore, by the act of 1795, ch. 11,
a plain and easy remedy was provided. The preamble
distinctly evinces, that it was suggested, less by an anxiety
to facilitate the remedies of the slave, than by the "great and
alarming mischiefs, which had arisen in other states of the
Union, and were likely to arise in this, by voluntary
associations of individuals" (commonly known under the
appellation of emancipation societies) "who had, in many
instances, been the means of depriving masters of their
property in slaves, and in others occasioned them heavy
expenses in tedious and unfounded law suits.',235

232 State v. Fraser, Dud. 43,43-44, 1 Ga. Rep. 373, 374 (Super. Ct. 1831) ("By this
act a most ample and complete remedy is given to negroes held in slavery who claim to
be free."); Thornton v. DeMoss, 13 Miss. (1 S. & M.) 609, 616-617 (1846) ("[Ilt is the
only remedy which he can pursue ... that remedy necessarily excludes every other,
and must be strictly pursued.").
233 Higgenbotham, Jr. & Higgenbotham, supra note 97, at 1213, 1235 n.125
(addressing habeas corpus suits).
234 E.g., Field, 17 Ala. at 82 (stating that the statute "provided the manner in
which the presumption [that a black is a slave] may be removed."); Cone v. Force, 31
Ga. 328, 330 (1860) ("The General Assembly has formally and distinctly provided both
the proceeding by which, and the forum in which, the status of negroes held in slavery,
but claiming to be free, shall be investigated and determined."); Knight v. Hardeman,
17 Ga. 253, 260 (1855) (questioning whether the statutes "afford the most full and
complete remedy, to enable persons of color to assert their freedom?"); Thornton, 13
Miss. at 616-617 (holding that the remedy set forth in the Mississippi statute
"necessarily excludes every other, and must be strictly pursued.").
235 Nicholas v. Burruss, 31 Va. 289, 298 (1833) (Tucker, J.). E.g., De Lacy v.
Antoine, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 438, 439 (1836) ("[ulnder our law the habeas corpus is not the
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Virginia freedom suits were sometimes brought as suits for
trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. Their
object was the removal "of the claimant from the status of
slavery to that of freedom; ... the form is wholly fictitious."236
According to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, slaves
had "no personal rights .... The only suit they can bring is for
the recovery of freedom; and even during its pendency they still
continue slaves . . .. A suit for freedom is founded upon the
concession that the status of the claimant is that of slavery;
otherwise the remedy would be inappropriate."237
D. A CHIMPANZEE MAy USE THE COMMON LAW WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS TO CHALLENGE HIS OR HER LEGAL
THINGHOOD

From its beginnings as a thirteenth century writ that
judges used to have stubborn parties brought before them, the
common law writ of habeas corpus evolved by the end of the
seventeenth century into the usual procedure by which a legal
person, or an entity claiming to be one, could test the legality of
his detention by any private or public entity, in any place,
under any circumstances. Extremely broad and impervious to
technicalities, the writ of habeas corpus, in both its statutory
and common law forms continues to remain available to
remedy every illegal restraint. 238 It is "a remedy of right
untrammeled by any requirement of discretion. The judge
hearing the writ may, ex parte, direct immediate release. This
proper method of trying the right to freedom. The' act of 1795 has prescribed the
remedy which the negro must pursue . . . . Anteriour to this act, the habeas corpus and
homine replegiando were resorted to by slaves asserting a right to freedom; but as
these remedies proved vexatious and unsafe, a new proceeding was prescribed by. the
act already cited, the homine replegiando was repealed, and the habeas corpus was
considered no longer appropriate") (emphasis in original). The 1795 Act was codified at
1 Rev. Code ch. 124, § 4, p. 481.
236 Peter v. Hargrave, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 12, 14 (1848) (emphasis in original).
237 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Leon Higgenbotham, Jr. & Higgenbotham,
supra note 97, at 1213, 1235-36 n.125 (1993). The 1845 Missouri Freedom Suit Act,
Rev. Stat. (1845), ch. 69, p. 531, authorized a suit for trespass for false imprisonment.
Neither the writ of habeas corpus nor the writ of de homine replegiando were based
either on a fiction or a concession that the petitioner was a slave. Contra, Huger v.
Barnwell, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 273, 275 (1852).
238 Church, supra note 166, at 137-38. The writ of habeas corpus is not intended
to punish the respondent, grant the petitioner redress for his illegal detention, or
secure a right to property, for only a jury can do that. Hurd, supra note 20, at 143, 147,
210,551.
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is the nuclear weapon of public law.,,239 As with the common
law writ of de homine replegiando, the common law writ of
habeas corpus may be invoked by any petitioner claiming to be
unlawfully detained in any state that incorporated the common
law of England. 240
The common law writ of habeas corpus was never limited
to petitioners already acknowledged to be legal persons. To the
contrary, it was used by petitioners who were understood to be
legal things, but who alleged that the Great Writ ought to
shelter them. Most prominently, the writ was wielded by black
slaves who were themselves legal things.
As has been
CLARKA& McCoY, supra note 157, at 214 (citation omitted).
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 17; ALA. CODE § 15-21-1 (2005); ALAsKA CONST. art. I, §
13; ALASKA STAT. § 12.75.010 (2005); ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 14; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-4121 (2005); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 11; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-103 (2006); CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 11; CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1473 (2005); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 21; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-45-102 (2005); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 12; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52466 (2004); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 13; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10 § 6902 (2005); FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 13; FLA. STAT. § 79.01 (2005); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 15; GA. CODE ANN. §
9-14-1(2005); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 15; HAw. REV. STAT. § 660-3 (2005); IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4201 (2005); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. COMPo STAT.
5/10-103 (2003); IND. CONST. art. I, § 27; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-25.5-1-1 (2005); IOWA
CONST. art. I, § 13; IOWA CODE ANN. § 663.1 (2004); KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 8; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1501 (2005); Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 16; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419.020
(2005); ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5501 (2005); MD. CONST.
art. III, § 55; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-701 (2005); MASs. CONST. pt. 2, ch.
6, art. VII; MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 248, § 1 (2005); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 12; MICH. COMPo
LAWS. ANN. § 600.4301 (2005); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 589.01
(2005); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 21; MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-43-1 (2005); MO. CONST. art.
I, § 12; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 532.010 (2006); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 19; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-22-201 (2005); NEB. CON ST. art. I, § 8; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2801 (2005); NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 5; NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.360 (2005); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 91; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 534:1 (2005); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:67-13
(2006); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 7; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-1-1 (2005); N.Y. CONST. art. I, §
4; NY C.P.L.R § 7003 (2005); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-3 (2005);
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CENT. CODE, § 32-22-01 (2005); Omo CONST. art. I § 8;
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2725.01 (2006); OKLA. CONST art. II, § 10; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 41 (2005); OR. CONST. art. I, § 23; OR. REV. STAT. § 34.310 (2003); PA. CONST. art.
I, § 14; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6503 (2005); RI. CONST. art. I, § 9; RI. GEN. LAWS §
8-8-4 (2006); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-17-10 (2004); S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 8; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 21-27-1 (2006); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-21-101 (2005); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 12; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 26.047
(2005); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 5; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35-1 (2005) (requiring judges
who wrongfully and willfully refuse to grant a writ of habeas corpus after proper
application to pay $5,000 to the wronged applicant); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 41; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 3951 (2005); VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654 (2005);
WASH. CONST. art. I, § ; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.010 (2005); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 4;
W. VA. CODE § 53-4-1 (2005); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WIS. STAT. § 782.01 (2005); WYO.
CONST. art. 1, § 17; WYO. STAT. ANN. 1-27-101 (2005).
239
240
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discussed, the writ's most famous and effective deployment was
by Lord Mansfield in 1772 on behalf of James Somerset, which
permitted him to declare that Somerset was not, in law, a
slave. Later, other black slaves would use the writ both in
England and in America, especially in the North, to challenge
the legality of their enslavement. 241 Today Somerset is law in
nearly every state. 242
Science has clearly demonstrated that chimpanzees
possess the qualities that make them plausible candidates to
use the common law writ of habeas corpus to establish that
they should not be considered legal ihings. Genetically so
similar to human beings that some scientists argue that both
should be placed in the same genus, chimpanzees are
extremely complex beings-cognitively, emotionally, and
socially. They suffer the loss of the bodily liberty that the writ
of habeas corpus is designed to protect in a manner similar to
the way humans suffer that loss. Perhaps they suffer it even
more acutely, for they cannot understand why we enslave
them, the world in which we enslave them is one in which they
are genetically, physically, emotionally, or culturally ill-suited,
and their housing conditions are worse than any conditions of
human detention that comply with international legal norms.
The merits of a writ of habeas corpus filed by a chimpanzee
petitioner will have to be decided by a judge, not a jury, for the
writ of habeas corpus is intended to be a more summary
procedure that is the common law writ de homine replegiando.
However, facts concerning a chimpanzee's genetics, taxonomy,
anatomy, physiology, neurology, psychology, anthropology,
cognitive ethology, linguistic and mathematical abilities, and
other biological, anthropological, genetic, or psychological
attributes may be disputed in any return to the writ. These
facts will need to be settled before a judge can proceed to the
ultimate legal issue of whether chimpanzees are entitled, as a
matter of law, to freedom from their claimed detention. Any
such facts, however, can be properly settled. Justice Sharpe's
explanation of how judges might avoid the common law rule
against controverting the return to a writ of habeas corpus
helps explain how Lord Mansfield could issue his famous writ
for James Somerset, and order his freedom from slavery, in the
241
242

Cf Forbes v. Cochran, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 450, 458-459 (K.B.) (Best, J.).
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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face of Captain Knowles' return to the writ that Somerset was
legally Charles Steuart's slave. 243 The various methods that
Judge Sharpe describes would similarly apply to any common
law habeas corpus action brought by a chimpanzee petitioner.
As was noted at the onset of this Article, one court recently
started down this path. On April 10, 2005, Environmental
Department prosecutors and others sought a writ of habeas
corpus from a court in Bahia, Brazil on behalf of a chimpanzee
named Suica, who was caged at a ZOO.244 The petitioners
claimed that "in a free society, committed to ensuring freedom
and equality, laws evolve according to people's thinking and
behavior, and when public attitudes change, so does the law,
and several authors believe that the Judiciary can be a
powerful social change agent."245 Before the case could be
finally adjudicated, Suica died. Accordingly, on September 28,
2005, the judge dismissed the case. He explained, however,
that he had taken the case
[because] the theme is deserving of discussion as this is a
highly complex issue, requiring an in-depth examination of
"pros and cons," therefore, I did not grant the Habeas Corpus
writ, preferring rather to obtain information from the coplaintiff authority ... within 72 hours. . .. One could, from
the very topic of the petition, have enough grounds to
dismiss it, from the very outset, arguing the legal
impossibility of the request, or absolute inapplicability of the
legal instrument sought by the petitioners, that is, a Habeas
Corpus to transfer an animal from the environment in which
it lives, to another. However, in order to inci:e debate of this
issue ... I decided to admit the argument .... Among the
factors that influenced my accepting this matter for
discussion is the fact that among the petitioners are persons
with presumed broad legal knowledge, such as Prosecutors
and Law professors . . .. Criminal Procedural Law is not
static, rather subject to constant changes, and new decisions
246
have to adapt to new times.

See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
In Favor ofSuica, supra note l.
245
Id .
246
Id .
243

244
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VI. CONCLUSION

I have offered substantive arguments elsewhere that
chimpanzees should no longer be treated as common law
things, but as persons, at least to the extent of being entitled to
the fundamental right of bodily liberty. The structure of the
common law requires judges to re-evaluate every common law
rule, when appropriate. In order for judges to carry out their
duty, a cause of action must be available. I have argued that at
least two ancient common law writs are available, the writ de
homine replegiando and the writ of habeas corpus in nearly
every American state and that both writs were often used by
human villeins and black slaves over the centuries in which
they were considered legal things. 247
I conclude that
chimpanzees are entitled to use these two common law writs to
bring their substantive arguments to the attention of courts for
decision on the merits.
A court need not worry about where to draw the line on
which nonhuman petitioners might invoke these causes of
action to seek to establish their fundamental common law right
to bodily liberty. Every imprisoned being who, in light of
advances in scientific knowledge, evolution in public morality
and public policy, and accretion of human experience, has a
colorable substantive claim to this fundamental right is
entitled to place that claim before a court, where it may fail or
succeed on its merits. Chimpanzees hate to be imprisoned. A
wild chimpanzee has an average daily travel range of several
kilometers and a yearly travel range of about ten square
kilometers. 248 One chimpanzee named Booee, taught American
Sign Language before being imprisoned in the cramped cage of
a biomedical research· facility for six years, made his wishes
unmistakably known to a visiting representative of the facility
where he had learned that language. "KEY OUT," he signed. 249
Whatever might be the strength of the claim of any other
nonhuman animal, a chimpanzee is such a petitioner.
247 See supra notes 134 and 240 for citations to those states that adopted English
common law and statutes in general and the common law writ of habeas corpus
specifically.
248 JANE GOODALL, THE CmMPANZEES OF GOMBE-PA'ITERNS OF BEHAVIOR 207230 (Belkap Press 1986).
249 ROGER FOUTS & STEPHEN TUKEL MILLs, NEXT OF KIN-WHAT CmMPANZEES
HAVE TAUGHT ME ABOUT WHO WE ARE 354-358 (William Morrow & Co. 1997).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss2/1

62

